What is Hedging in Academic Writing? - Enago Academy

Ideias de hedge para carteira de ações

Estou curioso em algumas estratégias de hedge pra uma carteira de ações de pessoa física, uns falam que é interessante ter ouro e dólar, mas acho um pouco limitante pra PF ( Já viu os custos operacionais operar ouro na BMF ?), dólar pode ser interessante mas ele não tem uma correlação negativa perfeita com o Ibovespa ( algumas ações se beneficiam da alta do dólar ). Então me veio que poderia dolarizando a carteira com empresas que faturam em dólar, porém quando o movimento de baixa é sistemático, acaba afetando todas as empresas, esse é o limite da diversificação. Pensei que talvez uma boa opção seria fazer rolagem com opções de venda bem dentro do dinheiro (DITM), pois elas tem um delta alto, baixos custos operacionais, e os prêmio podem ser rolado comprando com "desconto" opções de vencimentos seguintes. Mas é uma ideia, o que acham?
submitted by Sait22 to investimentos [link] [comments]

10K USD para invertir (Opinion sobre hedge funds que manejen la guita)

Buenas gente, supongamos que teoricamente tengo unos hipoteticos 10.000 USD que no quisiera tener quietos, que me recomiendan?

Estuve leyendo mucho, desde ya que PF queda descartado, FCI descartado y basicamente todo lo que sea en argentina queda descartado. Estuve viendo que recomiendan mucho hacer cuenta afuera (veo que recomiendan mucho Ameritrade) e invertirla en acciones o ETFs.

Tengo conocimientos de como invertir, conozco lo basico y anduve jugando un poco con cedears, no es un mundo desconocido para mi pero sin embargo con pesos me hago el guapo y con dolares no estoy tan seguro, ademas de que honestamente no tengo el tiempo para ir viendo el mercado dia a dia y estar leyendo twitter cada minuto a ver que dijo papa elon o trump.

Por otro lado estuve viendo hedge funds que ellos se encargan de manejarte la guita, tengo un par en vista pero no quiero dar nombres para no hacer chivo o por si está prohibido pero me atrae la idea de no tener que estar pendiente de los analisis de mercado y simplemente sentirme seguro sabiendo que alguien (capacitado y confiable) me la estaría manejando. Me interesaría saber que opinan ustedes sobre estos fondos, algo que tener en cuenta? referencias? experiencias? alguna otra opción?

Mil gracias de ante mano
submitted by Allarik to merval [link] [comments]

HEDGE: REMÉDIO FUNDAMENTAL PARA TRAVAR PREJUÍZO EM SUA CARTEIRA DE LONGO PRAZO - Dicas sobre Bitcoin - mais rápido rápido

HEDGE: REMÉDIO FUNDAMENTAL PARA TRAVAR PREJUÍZO EM SUA CARTEIRA DE LONGO PRAZO - Dicas sobre Bitcoin - mais rápido rápido submitted by infocryptocoins to CertificadoDigital [link] [comments]

Futuro de IPCA

Existe um derivativo na B3 que é o cupom futuro de IPCA. Sei que alguns fundos de debentures usam ele para eliminar parte da oscilações decorrentes dos movimentos da curva de juros. Porém, não consegui entender como funciona exatamente. Será que dá para um investidor comum usar esses cupons como hedge para as oscilações de NTN-Bs longas ? Neste caso, ele estaria se protegendo de grandes variações no IPCA, de grandes variações no yield das NTN-Bs ou de ambos ?
submitted by jecatatu1 to investimentos [link] [comments]

[Store]Dlore .25 2x Howling Dawn, Falchion Sapphire 0,004, Talon/Kara Phase 2, 3x Kara Lore ST FT, ST Bayo Lore FN, 99% Fade Huntsman, Crimson Kimono .12 MW, Glove CW MW, Para Fade, AK Fire Serpent 0.08, Hedge Maze FT

Some Items might be tradelocked, feel free to add in this case!
Crypto accepting BTC, LTC and ETH.
If you have trust issues i accept Cash Sites (+5%)

https://steamcommunity.com/tradeoffenew/?partner=100421707&token=k4zBS5Uc

Item: - B/O: In Items - B/O: In Cash - Float
AWP | Dragon Lore (Field-Tested) $3.499,00 $2.691,54 0.2579653859
★ Specialist Gloves | Crimson Kimono (Minimal Wear) $2.199,00 $1.691,54 0.1284943223
★ Paracord Knife | Fade (Factory New) $1.499,00 $1.153,08 0.0260563176
★ Falchion Knife | Doppler (Factory New) Sapphire $1.299,00 $999,23 0.0047370996
★ Karambit | Doppler (Factory New) Phase 2 $849,00 $653,08 0.0251951814
★ Talon Knife | Doppler (Factory New) Phase 2: $799,00 $614,62 0.0313339569
★ Specialist Gloves | Crimson Web (Minimal Wear) $949,00 $730,00 0.1426534057
★ Sport Gloves | Hedge Maze (Field-Tested) $1.029,00 $791,54 0.3540289700
★ StatTrak™ Bayonet | Lore (Factory New) $1.499,00 $1.153,08 0.0612822771
AK-47 | Fire Serpent (Minimal Wear) $899,00 $691,54 0.0815306008
★ M9 Bayonet | Lore (Field-Tested) $649,00 $499,23 0.2550747693
★ StatTrak™ Karambit | Lore (Field-Tested) $679,00 $522,31 0.2732099891
★ StatTrak™ Karambit | Lore (Field-Tested) $699,00 $537,69 0.2103933245
★ StatTrak™ Karambit | Lore (Field-Tested) $679,00 $522,31 0.2844807208
★ Driver Gloves | Imperial Plaid (Field-Tested) $449,00 $345,38 0.3507888317
★ StatTrak™ Karambit | Black Laminate (Field-Tested) $489,00 $376,15 0.2802577615
★ StatTrak™ Karambit | Black Laminate (Field-Tested) $489,00 $376,15 0.2524135411
★ Huntsman Knife | Crimson Web (Minimal Wear) $319,00 $245,38 0.1396977007
★ StatTrak™ Bowie Knife | Tiger Tooth (Factory New) $279,00 $214,62 0.0660157055
★ M9 Bayonet | Damascus Steel (Factory New) $299,00 $230,00 0.0595197007
★ Huntsman Knife | Fade (Factory New) 99% Fade $319,00 $245,38 0.0098951133
★ StatTrak™ M9 Bayonet | Damascus Steel (Field-Tested) $279,00 $214,62 0.2221065611
★ Ursus Knife | Case Hardened (Minimal Wear) $225,00 $173,08 0.1402968168
★ Shadow Daggers | Fade (Factory New) 89% Fade $205,00 $157,69 0.0272927992
★ StatTrak™ Shadow Daggers | Case Hardened (Minimal Wear) $176,08 $135,45 0.1271591038
★ StatTrak™ Shadow Daggers | Case Hardened (Minimal Wear) $176,08 $135,45 0.1252478063
★ StatTrak™ Shadow Daggers | Ultraviolet (Minimal Wear) $155,00 $119,23 0.1416968107
★ StatTrak™ Bowie Knife | Blue Steel (Field-Tested) $160,00 $123,08 0.2544521987
★ Gut Knife | Doppler (Factory New) Phase 2 $155,00 $119,23 0.0112205073
★ StatTrak™ Gut Knife | Night (Minimal Wear) $131,22 $100,94 0.1282256544
AK-47 | Vulcan (Minimal Wear) $139,00 $106,92 0.1242242381
★ StatTrak™ Navaja Knife | Case Hardened (Field-Tested) $135,00 $103,85 0.3509870768
★ StatTrak™ Ursus Knife | Forest DDPAT (Field-Tested) $120,00 $92,31 0.2279654890
★ Stiletto Knife | Rust Coat (Battle-Scarred) $106,83 $82,18 0.6472365260
USP-S | Kill Confirmed (Minimal Wear) $109,00 $83,85 0.0808207616
StatTrak™ AK-47 | Neon Rider (Battle-Scarred) $55,00 $42,31 0.5339045525
AWP | Wildfire (Field-Tested) $49,00 $37,69 0.1887719035
AWP | Asiimov (Battle-Scarred) $45,96 $35,35 0.6564018726


https://steamcommunity.com/tradeoffenew/?partner=100421707&token=k4zBS5Uc
submitted by xN3on to GlobalOffensiveTrade [link] [comments]

[Store]Dlore .25 2x Howling Dawn, Falchion Sapphire 0,004, Talon/Kara Phase 2, 3x Kara Lore ST FT, ST Bayo Lore FN, 99% Fade Huntsman, Crimson Kimono .12 MW, Glove CW MW, Para Fade, AK Fire Serpent 0.08, Hedge Maze FT

Some Items might be tradelocked, feel free to add in this case!
Crypto accepting BTC, LTC and ETH.
If you have trust issues i accept Cash Sites (+5%)

https://steamcommunity.com/tradeoffenew/?partner=100421707&token=k4zBS5Uc

Item: - B/O: In Items - B/O: In Cash - Float
AWP | Dragon Lore (Field-Tested) $3.499,00 $2.691,54 0.2579653859
★ Specialist Gloves | Crimson Kimono (Minimal Wear) $2.199,00 $1.691,54 0.1284943223
★ Paracord Knife | Fade (Factory New) $1.499,00 $1.153,08 0.0260563176
★ Falchion Knife | Doppler (Factory New) Sapphire $1.299,00 $999,23 0.0047370996
★ Karambit | Doppler (Factory New) Phase 2 $849,00 $653,08 0.0251951814
★ Talon Knife | Doppler (Factory New) Phase 2: $799,00 $614,62 0.0313339569
★ Specialist Gloves | Crimson Web (Minimal Wear) $949,00 $730,00 0.1426534057
★ Sport Gloves | Hedge Maze (Field-Tested) $1.029,00 $791,54 0.3540289700
★ StatTrak™ Bayonet | Lore (Factory New) $1.499,00 $1.153,08 0.0612822771
AK-47 | Fire Serpent (Minimal Wear) $899,00 $691,54 0.0815306008
★ M9 Bayonet | Lore (Field-Tested) $649,00 $499,23 0.2550747693
★ StatTrak™ Karambit | Lore (Field-Tested) $679,00 $522,31 0.2732099891
★ StatTrak™ Karambit | Lore (Field-Tested) $699,00 $537,69 0.2103933245
★ StatTrak™ Karambit | Lore (Field-Tested) $679,00 $522,31 0.2844807208
★ Driver Gloves | Imperial Plaid (Field-Tested) $449,00 $345,38 0.3507888317
★ StatTrak™ Karambit | Black Laminate (Field-Tested) $489,00 $376,15 0.2802577615
★ StatTrak™ Karambit | Black Laminate (Field-Tested) $489,00 $376,15 0.2524135411
★ Huntsman Knife | Crimson Web (Minimal Wear) $319,00 $245,38 0.1396977007
★ StatTrak™ Bowie Knife | Tiger Tooth (Factory New) $279,00 $214,62 0.0660157055
★ M9 Bayonet | Damascus Steel (Factory New) $299,00 $230,00 0.0595197007
★ Huntsman Knife | Fade (Factory New) 99% Fade $319,00 $245,38 0.0098951133
★ StatTrak™ M9 Bayonet | Damascus Steel (Field-Tested) $279,00 $214,62 0.2221065611
★ Ursus Knife | Case Hardened (Minimal Wear) $225,00 $173,08 0.1402968168
★ Shadow Daggers | Fade (Factory New) 89% Fade $205,00 $157,69 0.0272927992
★ StatTrak™ Shadow Daggers | Case Hardened (Minimal Wear) $176,08 $135,45 0.1271591038
★ StatTrak™ Shadow Daggers | Case Hardened (Minimal Wear) $176,08 $135,45 0.1252478063
★ StatTrak™ Shadow Daggers | Ultraviolet (Minimal Wear) $155,00 $119,23 0.1416968107
★ StatTrak™ Bowie Knife | Blue Steel (Field-Tested) $160,00 $123,08 0.2544521987
★ Gut Knife | Doppler (Factory New) Phase 2 $155,00 $119,23 0.0112205073
★ StatTrak™ Gut Knife | Night (Minimal Wear) $131,22 $100,94 0.1282256544
AK-47 | Vulcan (Minimal Wear) $139,00 $106,92 0.1242242381
★ StatTrak™ Navaja Knife | Case Hardened (Field-Tested) $135,00 $103,85 0.3509870768
★ StatTrak™ Ursus Knife | Forest DDPAT (Field-Tested) $120,00 $92,31 0.2279654890
★ Stiletto Knife | Rust Coat (Battle-Scarred) $106,83 $82,18 0.6472365260
USP-S | Kill Confirmed (Minimal Wear) $109,00 $83,85 0.0808207616
StatTrak™ AK-47 | Neon Rider (Battle-Scarred) $55,00 $42,31 0.5339045525
AWP | Wildfire (Field-Tested) $49,00 $37,69 0.1887719035
AWP | Asiimov (Battle-Scarred) $45,96 $35,35 0.6564018726


https://steamcommunity.com/tradeoffenew/?partner=100421707&token=k4zBS5Uc
submitted by xN3on to Csgotrading [link] [comments]

Entrevista de Cris Hedges com Roger Hallam, co-fundador do Extinction Rebellion sobre "Desobediência Civil para parar o Ecocídio"

Entrevista de Cris Hedges com Roger Hallam, co-fundador do Extinction Rebellion sobre submitted by HavaianaMaori to brasil [link] [comments]

Crédito habitação: taxa fixa, variável ou mista?

Olá,
Quero comprar casa e ando a investigar os créditos de habitação. O que aconselham em relação ao tipo de taxa? A variável é imprevisivel mas a fixa fica com uma prestação muito alta, será melhor a mista com 10 anos fixa e depois o resto variável?
Vou pedir 140.000€ com 20.000€ de entrada e gostaria de conseguir pagar em 30 anos
Obrigada
submitted by dianaonrails to literaciafinanceira [link] [comments]

Fuga de investidores do Brasil mais que dobra em 2020 - 06/10/2020 - Mercado - Folha

Fuga de investidores do Brasil mais que dobra em 2020 - 06/10/2020 - Mercado - Folha submitted by NegoLeleu to investimentos [link] [comments]

ETF e influências cambiais. Qual o nosso risco ao comprar em dólar e não em euro?

Boa noite. Estou a começar a investir em acções e ETF e gostaria de esclarecer uma dúvida que ainda não vi respondida em nenhum dos posts por aqui publicados. Estou interessado num ETF IWDA comprado na euronext Amsterdão. O ETF é cotado em usd mas nós compramos em euro? E apesar de o ETF ter apresentado bons rendimentos no passado, quando chegar à altura de vender não corrermos o risco de ver o lucro todo a ir embora no cão de alterações relevantes de câmbio? A minha ideia era reforçar o ETF mensalmente lá tenho algum receio deste aspeto e não encontrei informação sobre isto. Também queria investir em acções dos EUA mas tenho a mesma dificuldade. A minha corretora é a degiro. Agradeço desde já quem me possa esclarecer.
submitted by Ze_Pipoca to literaciafinanceira [link] [comments]

Arbitrage opportunities in options - how options are priced, explained in layman's terms - without resorting to the BS pricing model

Arbitrage opportunities in options - how options are priced, explained in layman's terms - without resorting to the BS pricing model
Alright retards, I've been laid off at work due to beervirus and I've been eyeing and toying with the idea to get back into options trading. I'm writing this post to raise the bar for discussion on this sub, I'm tired of seeing just memes. We'll never match WSB unless there is a healthy mix of dankass memes and geniass discussions.
Now, when it comes to options, I am completely self-taught (completely from first principles, back in 2008, before you autists came up with the idea of watching videos on youtube). Since I am completely self-taught, my perspective will be different from the people who learnt this stuff while studying MBA/finance courses/NSE accredited investing courses. So if what I'm saying is different from what you've heard from the dude who swindled you of 20K for two days of options education or your gay BF's live-in partner, remember when it comes to maths, there are many ways of approaching a problem, ultimately, all are the same - profit means account balance goes up, loss means a loss post on ISB goes up.
Now, I'm assuming that you understand how options work. If not, I suggest heading to Zerodha's Varsity to read up on options. If you're too lazy for this, get your micro-dick outta options, this is a man's game, surprise butt-sex awaits amateurs.
I'm also assuming that you've come to realise that the sustainable way to make money in options is to write options. Unless you've got Trump or Ambani on speed dial to get access to news before it becomes news, YOLOing whatever rent money you have on buying options will blow up your account, eventually.
Writing options also means the possibility of account balance going tits up is a real possibility. You gotta, gotta, gotta measure and manage your risk. You can do this only when you understand options as well as your dick.
Towards this, I intend to put up a bunch of posts (depending on many of you shit heads are still reading at this point) that comment about little things that are more of 'wisdom' than 'education'.
The example below talks about currency derivatives. Why currency? Read below:
  • Lower margin needed. I can short a CE/PE contract with only Rs.2000, unlike the >Rs. 70,000 for index contracts. You get to learn, play and wisen up with an order of magnitude less money than with Nifty or Banknifty contracts.
  • More stable underlying. When you're shorting contracts, the last thing you want is the underlying asset going crazy like a broncho during rodeo.
  • Less autistic crowd in the currency market. While banknifty options attract retards like flies to poop, currency derivatives attract a more educated crowd.
  • Sooner or later, you end up acquiring a more balanced education on economics as a whole, rather than the shit fest that goes on in the local circles.
  • The more contracts you can short, the more strategies you can pursue
  • Decent hedging is possible without throwing away all of your potential profits
  • Lesser stress (anybody else going through premature hairloss or is it just me?) because of points outlined above.
Alright, today, I'm going point how the put-call parity works and by extension, show proof for 'efficient markets' by pointing out how opportunities for arbitrage is pretty much non existent, so you guys can cool it with the whole 'market manipulators' knee jerk reaction.
Alright, to start off, here's the current spot rate of the USD-INR pair:
https://preview.redd.it/qup28ay567j51.jpg?width=452&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=b79ef1a3480e5cbafa42547143c651397ec57f13
Here's today's USD-INR futures closing rate for Sep expiry:
https://preview.redd.it/krghirc677j51.jpg?width=511&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=60d52b785baa8a1cd240d0df7949a48c8391ba2d
The difference between spot and futures rates is due to differences in what is construed as 'risk-free' interest rates in the US and in India. Check out this video if you want to understand why the Sep futures is trading at a premium of 27 paisa to the spot rate.
Alright, so the deal is, if you buy 1 futures contract @ 74.49, unless the USDINR exchange rate rises by 27 paisa at the end of Sep (i.e. a spot rate of 74.49) you won't make a profit (ignoring brokerage and stuff). If the exchange rate were to remain the same without any change, you stand to lose (0.27 * 1000, currency derivatives have a lot size of 1000) Rs. 270 per lot. Even worse if the rupee were to appreciate (i.e. exchange spot rate goes down).
Now bear with me if the next few paras are exceedingly boorish, I need to spoon feed people who aren't used to currency derivatives. My strategies are mostly aimed at playing a more risk balanced play, something that yields consistent returns which can be compounded. 10% profit compounded monthly gives 314% growth per year, 3.5% profit compounded weekly gives ~600% growth per year.
Given how the USDINR rate is crashing, one way to profit would be to short a futures contract (duh!).
The orange line indicates the current USDINR exchange rate
As indicated above, if the exchange rate does nothing and remains as is till end of Sep, each lot of USDINR futures shorted yields about Rs. 250 in profit (for something that takes up Rs.3000 in margin, that's a >8% profit in return). Things look even better if the exchange rate were to fall further.
The problem is that things heat up quickly if the exchange rate were to go up. Ideally we would want to hedge against it (which also reduces the margin needed drastically). One way to hedge it would be to buy a at-the-money call (74.25CE @ rate of Rs. 0.555 -> Rs. 555 per lot (i.e 0.555*1000)).
https://preview.redd.it/ze16kyphv7j51.jpg?width=588&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=a3c2bba9fb314beff309671f03a013e69e08f4e0
Having purchased a call option, the P/L curve now looks like:
The max loss is now limited to Rs. 315
The keen-eyed among you will recognise the above P/L curve as one that matches that of a put option. By shorting a futures contract and buying a call option (both with same expiry), we have created a synthetic put option that would have costed us Rs. 315 (0.315*1000) for one lot.
Now, why go through all of this hassle if we can get the same returns by just buying a put option? Makes sense, as long as we can purchase the 74.25 strike put option at a price lesser than Rs. 0.315 (see above).
Let's see what the put options are going for:
Well, how about that...
The market price of 74.25 puts are exactly the same price as our synthetic put. While the synthetic put came in at Rs. 0.315, the put costs another 0.005 extra to avoid the trouble of shorting a futures contract and buying a call at the same time. This is not by chance, big trading desks have algos (trading bots for the virgins here) that keep an eye out for price disparities. In this case, if someone were to be willing to pay more, the algos would compete amongst themselves to sell the puts at any price above 0.32. And if someone were to be willing to sell a put for less than 0.315, the algos would immediately buy.
The price of the puts move in sync with the prices of the futures and call contracts. Conversely, we can create a synthetic call, and you will notice that the price of the synthetic call works out to be the same as the market price for the 74.25 strike call. We can also create a synthetic futures contract the same way.
The prices of derivatives aren't decided willy-nilly. They are precisely calculated at all times, which forms the basis for the best bid/ask prices. There is no room left for someone to come in and make free money via arbitraging using synthetic contracts.
If you found this insightful, and would like more of this sort of posts, let me know.
Options when used properly, can be used to generate risk adjusted returns that are commensurate with the amount of risk you are taking. If you are YOLO-ing, sure, you can double or triple your money, because you can also lose 100% of your margin. Conversely, you can aim for small, steady returns and compound the crap out of them. Play the long game, don't be penny wise and pound foolish.
submitted by circuit_brain to IndianStreetBets [link] [comments]

On Chinese influence operations in Singapore

On Chinese influence operations in Singapore
I answered this question on Quora and it got a modestly significant number of views (about 50 upvotes). but it got removed by moderation, I don't know why. Probably because it upset some Chinese nationalists/pro-Chinese Quorans (Lin Xieyi comes to mind). As we all know, Reddit is a liberal Western echo chamber so I suppose my views will find some resonance here.
I posted it on Quora because I think it's important to debunk some of the ill-informed and simplistic opinions about Singapore's foreign policy toward China. There are too many of those kinds of people voicing those opinions there. And I think too many of our people are not sufficiently educated on our foreign policy positions. This has to change if we are to be immunized against influence operations.
I am neither pro-China nor anti-China. I am pro-Singapore and anti-bullsh*t.
https://www.quora.com/Do-Singaporeans-agree-with-the-ex-diplomat-that-China-is-exercising-influence-pressure-and-coercion-on-Singapore?q=do%20singpoareans%20agree%20with%20the%20ex-diplomat

Do Singaporeans agree with the ex-diplomat that China is exercising influence, pressure and coercion on Singapore?

At first I didn’t, or was undecided, but now I do.
If you are a PRC patriot, or are uncomfortable with speculation and insinuations, please stop reading now. It’s for your own good.
Let’s examine the source in question. Who was this “ex-diplomat”?
· Bilahari Kausikan was former Permanent Secretary of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs
· He has substantial experience in the foreign policy arena. I assume he might be privy to classified information which is withheld from our public.
· He is no longer a civil servant; he is a pensioner. As such, his views do NOT officially reflect those of the Singapore government.
· Despite this, his views hold substantial weight and are frequently published in the Straits Times (which, although not under direct govt control, toes the official line and operates under some form of para-state oversight)
· He has not been outright repudiated by other foreign policy elites (as was the case with Kishore Mahbubani). From this we may infer that his views resonate somewhat with the establishment, or our foreign policy orthodoxy
· There are some things which our government cannot publicly/officially state, out of prudence…by which I mean, complicating our relationships with certain powers
· It is possible that the government prefers to use “unofficial” means (such as retired civil servants) to clarify or rebut certain narratives
Now let’s examine the substance of his argument.
That China exercises influence, pressure and coercion on Singapore, is not surprising. What should be disturbing is the MEANS or the CHANNELS through which it deploys its influence. There are LEGITIMATE channels for interstate intercourse. These include diplomacy, state media, international aid etc. etc. It is entirely natural (whether it is fair or acceptable is a different debate) for Great Powers to leverage their superior political/economic/military resources to make smaller states comply with their wishes, whether through persuasion or coercion.
But Bilahari Kausikan’s concern is with the ILLEGITIMATE channels: covert influence operations. These are violations of Singapore’s sovereignty, albeit under the cover of plausible deniability. Influence operations fall under the purview of covert action, which is different from espionage - and far more insidious. Espionage seeks simply to steal information. Covert action is intended to influence events (for example, domestic politics or foreign policy) within a target nation-state to one’s own benefit
Now let me be clear: All Great Powers conduct influence operations and espionage. China is no exception. Neither is the US. And Singapore is not exempted from their attempts. Our response has been very even-handed.Examples of foreign interference in the course of history and in SingaporeAn American diplomat once tried to influence the 1988 Singapore General ElectionSingapore Protests U.S. 'Interference' After Diplomat WithdrawnRussia spy claims: US nabs Singapore centre research fellow
But this is not a valid excuse. People who employ this excuse are essentially saying “So what? everyone does it”. To quote the Chinese Ambassador’s response “I would say firstly that every country hopes to gain recognition and support for its development philosophy and foreign policies. In this sense, China is no different.” This is equivalent to arguing that wife-beating is acceptable, because many husbands beat their wives! The issue here is not that China or the US wants our support. The issue is the means by which they seek to procure our support.
American influence operations seek to impose a liberal-democratic ideology on Singapore. They are mostly ineffective because American notions of liberalism do not find much resonance among our public political consciousness. Nonetheless, these operations should be exterminated/neutralized whenever and wherever they are detected.
But Chinese influence operations are more dangerous and insidious because they seek to impose a CHINESE identity on multiracial Singapore. This is something much harder for our population to resist, particularly because our national identity is so young and malleable. The appeals of ethnicity and culture are primordial and enduring.

SPECULATION ON CHINA’S 2016-2017 INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN
In August, Huang Jing was exposed for giving “supposedly "privileged information" to a senior member of the LKY School, so it could be passed on to the Singapore Government. The information was duly conveyed by that senior member of the LKYSPP to very senior public officials who were in a position to direct Singapore's foreign policy”.
About 3 months later, LKYSPP Dean Kishore Mahbubani, who previously was a senior MFA diplomat (and presumably has contact with “very senior public officials who were in a position to direct Singapore’s foreign policy”), stepped down from his position. If you go on Youtube and watch the speeches and interviews he has been giving, he has become something of a hype-man advertising China’s rise.
I think we can put two and two together.
I do deeply respect Kishore Mahbubani. I think he is an intellectual worth reading and worth listening to. I have no doubt that he earnestly, sincerely believes in the views that he propounds. I definitely agree with many of his ideas about the rise of Asia and China. In fact, I will be buying his new book “Has China Won?”. But I also think some of his ideas regarding China lack nuance. Reality is often complex.
When Lin Xieyi speculated that Huang Jing was a US agent, this was Kausikan’s comment: “This is the sort of stuff we must expect, intended to confuse the issue. Some of it will come from the seemingly neutral or well-meaning or the naive or from those whom Lenin used to call 'useful idiots'”Ambassador-at-large, Bilahari Kausikan, scoffs at Quora user questioning who Huang Jing is working for
Kausikan shared more details on the Chinese influence campaign in this lecture, which I encourage all of you to watch:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZEploM2-ctw
If you don’t have time, I’ll summarize (tl;dr skip to the bolded italics):
When Singapore stood firm on its right to state its position on an issue of undoubted importance to us and to the region (South China Sea), the Chinese activated their influence apparatus and went into high gear to pressure the government - our government - to change position…
Not all influence operations pose the same degree of risk. The uniqueness of Beijing’s influence operations stems from China’s triple identities. And this prescribes three tracks on which China conducts its foreign policy and influence operations.
First, the PRC is a state like any other state, operating within a still largely Westphalian international order… On this first track of state-to-state relations, there’s nothing particularly unusual about what Beijing does, except the unusually assertive assertive behaviour of some Chinese diplomats of late, in countries as far-ranging as Malaysia, the PNG and Sweden.
Secondly, the PRC is not just any state, it’s also a Leninist state…and the characteristic modus operandi of a Leninist state is the United Front, which Mao Zedong called the CCP’s “magic weapon”… the main characteristic of a Leninist state is the total subordination of state and society to the interests of the Party, irrespective whether the Party’s interest is internal or external. And as such, the United Front represents a blurring of the distinction between domestic and foreign policies and a significant modification of the principle of non-interference that goes far beyond what is generally considered acceptable diplomatic practice.
Thirdly, the PRC is also a civilizational state: the embodiment and exemplar of millennia of the Chinese nation’s history and culture, now rejuvenated…and this identity as a civilizational state finds expression in the work of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office… In plain language, overseas Chinese should identify their interests with China’s interests and work to advance China’s interests. And this represents a deliberate blurring of the distinction made between the 华人 (ethnic Chinese) and the 华侨 (overseas PRC citizens)…
Now these 3 identities prescribe 3 tracks on which China conducts relationships. And taken holistically, they create a sophisticated and flexible instrument of influence that is far more effective than the conventional operations conducted by other countries. China’s influence operations are effective because the 3 tracks on which it operates makes it difficult to deal with or even grasp - even understand - in entirety.
On the first track of state-to-state relations, the usual tactics of persuasion, inducement or coercion may be deployed as appropriate, whether overtly through diplomacy or covertly through intelligence organizations. But the United Front may simultaneously operate to, for example, emphasize coercion or inducement even as the first track stresses persuasion. And the third civilizational track may conveniently wrap everything up in appeals to ethnic pride…Now the tendency of all governments and in particular foreign ministries is to focus on the first track of state-to-state relations and to want to keep them on an even keel…But this can all to easily lead to Chinese activities on the other two tracks being overlooked or downplayed.
[the narrative of China’s absolute rise and America’s inevitable decline] and others were propagated by various means: WeChat with Chinese-speaking populations, social and mainstream media, whispering campaigns, business, clan and cultural associations, as well as conventional agents of influence reporting to Chinese intelligence organizations who cultivate what Lenin called “useful idiots”.
It was difficult to pin down the precise origin of such narratives, but the messaging was to consistent, and too insistent, to be coincidental…many Singaporeans did not realize they were being fed oversimplifications and swallowed them whole or played along for other reasons. Businessmen, academics, and others with interests in China were given broad hints that their interests might suffer unless Singapore was more accommodating and passed the messages to the government…Appeals to ethnic pride were made to others. The aim was to instil a fatalistic acceptance of the inevitability and desirability of a Chinese identity for multiracial Singapore and get Singaporeans to pressure the government to align Singapore’s interests with China’s interest.
In any case and for whatever reason, the 2016–2017 Chinese influence operation was effective. The pressures on the government were great. It was very difficult to explain the somewhat abstract importance of UNCLOS or the nuances of our position on the South China Sea or the complications of our relationship with China to the general public, to whom the Chinese narratives were more easily understood. And it cannot be denied that ethnic appeals resonated strongly with a probably not insignificant section of our public.
It’s clear enough for whom Huang Jing worked. I told you he had dual US-PRC citizenship. In case you don’t know, holding dual citizenship is forbidden in China. Huang Jing today holds a senior academic position in China, apparently without sanction for holding American citizenship.
As the only majority ethnic Chinese sovereign state in the region, Singapore is a special case. A majority Chinese Singapore that nevertheless conducts an independent foreign policy may be something of an anomaly in Chinese eyes.
This is not the ravings of some conspiracy theorist. This is our former Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs speaking.

STRATEGIC NARRATIVES
What is a strategic narrative? A weaponized story.
In its influence campaigns against Singapore, the PRC advances a number of strategic narratives, all of which are, at best, questionable in their truthfulness. Sadly, some of our Singaporean Chinese compatriots sometimes buy into these narratives and even confidently echo them. Now, most of our population is only cursorily interested in foreign affairs and may find such superficial narratives plausible. This must change if they are to be immunized against these narratives.
This is a war of narratives. China cannot officially pressure us to choose sides. But they can paint a certain picture through unofficial channels and try to box us into a corner. They can try to tell us “See, this is what you are doing! Stop it!”. When they do that, we MUST push back by painting our own narratives and showing them that “no, actually we’re not doing that. We’re doing THIS”.
MYTH 1. Surely as a “Chinese country”, Singapore should “explain” China’s position (on the South China Sea and other issues) to the rest of Southeast Asia
MYTH 2. China is rising and US is declining; therefore we should bandwagon with China. You should get on the right side of history!
MYTH 3. If you are not with China, then you are against China! You are an American puppet/proxy, or, if you are ethnic Chinese, even worse - a race traitor!
MYTH 4. Singapore has no claims in the South China Sea, and purports to be a neutral/non-aligned country so why is it “taking sides” with the US against China by agreeing with the PCA ruling and hosting US naval assets?
MYTH 5. Unlike Lee Kuan Yew, the current PAP leadership under Lee Hsien Loong doesn’t know how to deal with China. Relations were sooooo much better under LKY.
Let me proceed to puncture each of these myths in turn, with great pleasure.
MYTH 1: We are NOT a “Chinese country”. We are a country that happens to have a majority ethnic-Chinese population that organizes itself on the basis of multiracialism/multiculturalism. This has been fundamental to Singapore’s identity since the days of Lee Kuan Yew, and this is something we must always remember, no matter how many times we are accused of being “race traitors” by our mainland friends. When the PRC tries to impose a “Chinese” identity on multiracial Singapore, we MUST resist.
Yes, we share ties with mainland Chinese on the basis of blood and culture. This ethnocultural kinship should be celebrated, not denied (as in the case of some HKers). Our similar cultural programming allows us to understand the Chinese mindset in some respects, to “empathize” with it.
But it does not mean we should unreservedly parrot China’s claims to the rest of Southeast Asia. As country coordinator for ASEAN-China relations, our job is to uphold ASEAN centrality; to represent the interests of ASEAN, of our REGION, in dealing with China. It is not to represent China’s interests in dealings with ASEAN. We have no obligation, moral or otherwise, to advocate or support China’s interests. Understanding them is one matter. Supporting them is another. The two are not mutually irreconcilable, but they must be distinguished.
MYTH 2: This myth, like many other myths, has a grain of truth to it. It is very ably represented by the speeches and works of Professor Kishore Mahbubani, our former ambassador and an intellectual whom I admire very much. Unfortunately, it is also extremely oversimplified and ignores many problematic nuances.Indeed, China is rising and has been for quite a while. You would have to be blind to deny that. But China’s rise is not going to be linear; it is going to be a long, winding, and fluctuating road. China has many internal structural problems of its own to deal with. From the way some people talk about China in juxtaposition to the West, it makes it sound like the Chinese are strategic masterminds while the Westerners are a bunch of bumbling idiots. Like I said, grain of truth, but grossly oversimplistic. It ignores many of the US’ intrinsic strengths and some of China’s structural challenges.
China is rising, but America is NOT in decline, except in relative terms. Militarily it is still pre-eminent in the Asia-Pacific. Its military dominance is receding and will continue to recede in time, as the PLA Navy becomes stronger. China is becoming more and more economically central to our region and the world; depending on which index of measurement you use (GDP PPP, GDP per capita, absolute GDP) it may have already eclipsed the US economy. China is pushing the frontiers of cutting-edge technology like 5G. This process is inevitable.
But what is not inevitable is the outcome of China displacing the US as regional or global superpower. This is an outcome that is FAR from certain. It is still too early to tell. The only thing we can say for now is that the regional strategic equation will become more and more symmetrical over time. As with buying new stocks/shares on the financial market, it is too early to count our chickens before they are hatched. Some views on China’s rise (Mahbubani’s included) tend to take the Whig view of history - “up and up and on and on”

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The Chinese never tire of reminding us that China’s presence in Asia is a permanent geographic fact, while America’s presence is the product of a political calculation. This implies both enhanced threat and opportunity for the rest of East Asia (be nice to us, because you have to live with us for the rest of eternity). And that is true - what is our Plan B if America withdraws from the region? Without America, the balance of power in Asia cannot be maintained. But again, this myth is too simplistic. America’s presence in Asia is not as fragile as the Chinese would like us to think.
Asia is burgeoning with growth. In the next few decades the economic center of gravity is going to shift toward the Asia-Pacific. America has an interest in retaining access to this region, in economic and military terms. I do agree that China cannot be contained - it is so interdependent with America that America might as well try to contain itself as to contain China. But we should not underestimate the degree to which America has integrated and committed itself to the Asia-Pacific.
MYTH 3: This one I find the most ludicrous and at the same time the most hilarious. Just because I disagree with China’s stance on a SPECIFIC, SINGLE issue means that I must have been brainwashed by western media into being an anti-China dog? Hahahaha.
This is what is known as a false dichotomy. It is powerful because these dichotomies do exist, but they are a spectrum rather than a binary choice of A or B. China posits an illusory binary between itself and the West, and forces you to choose between them. If you are not A, then you must be B and ONLY B and nothing else. Substitute A and B with pro-China and pro-US, pro-CCP and pro-democracy, blah blah blah. You get the idea. This ignores all the nuances in between.
This myth is also the most insidious and dangerous one because it denies the existence of AGENCY on the part of small states. It denies that small states can ever act autonomously -that anything that we do must be driven by the hidden hand of Great Power competition.
Singapore’s policy can be characterized as strategic hedging. I will admit we lean slightly toward low-intensity “soft” balancing against China, but it is still more nuanced than “hard” balancing against China and “hard” bandwagoning with the US.
By the way, Singapore is not the only country practicing a hedging strategy. Duterte has recently taken to flirting with China; I don’t blame him, I think it’s a smart move. But he has also increased cooperation with Japan, and he has not abolished the alliance Treaty which formally commits the US to defend the Philippines in wartime. Thailand has grown closer toward China as well, buying Chinese tanks, but it is still a US ally. Even Myanmar: when Myanmar realized in the 2000s and early 2010s that it was growing more and more dependent on Chinese investment, infrastructure etc., what did it do? It initiated a rapprochement with the Obama Administration. Malaysia under Mahathir began to reassess a number of Chinese infrastructure projects in light of its indebtedness to China. The American 7th Fleet still calls at Malaysian ports. Vietnam is probably leaning even further toward the Balancing end of the spectrum than Singapore - the very existence of Vietnam as an independent entity is predicated on thousands of years of resisting subordination to China.

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So, fellow Singaporeans, do not believe that we are alone in playing this delicate game of power-balancing. That is what China wants you to believe: that we are acting alone and inadvertently as a US proxy, when in reality we are making calculated choices to minimize risk and maximize gain.
MYTH 4: Yes, Singapore is a non-claimant state. We have no territorial claims in the South China Sea and we take no position on the claims of Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, China etc. But what we do have is an interest in FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION in the South China Sea (enshrined in international law, namely UNCLOS). We want our merchant ships carrying our imports and exports to be able to transition the South China Sea freely. Trade is the lifeblood of our free and open economy.
Now, some mainland Chinese might argue that China has not explicitly threatened the right of freedom of navigation in the area. They are right. China has not demanded we pay a toll or tariff for passing through the area, not yet anyway. Hopefully it never does. But China’s behavior of creating and militarizing artificial islands in the South China Sea has not exactly inspired confidence on the part of Southeast Asian states regarding its future behavior.
And in case you think our statement on the PCA’s verdict was somehow “extreme” or “new”, let me read out the statement to you:
Singapore has taken note of the Award made by the Arbitral Tribunal convened under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) on 12 July 2016 on the case between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China. We are studying the Award and its implications on Singapore and the wider region.
Singapore is not a claimant state and we do not take sides on the competing territorial claims. However, we support the peaceful resolution of disputes among claimants in accordance with universally recognised principles of international law, including Unclos, without resorting to the threat or use of force. As a small state, we strongly support the maintenance of a rules-based order that upholds and protects the rights and privileges of all states.
Singapore values our long-standing and friendly relations with all parties, bilaterally and in the context of Asean. We urge all parties to fully respect legal and diplomatic processes, exercise self-restraint and avoid conducting any activities that may raise tensions in the region.
Singapore supports the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the expeditious conclusion of a legally binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea
In other words, we did NOT even explicitly SUPPORT the ruling of the PCA in favor of the Philippines. We simply positively acknowledged the ruling and said that international law is important and we should all respect it. Can that be any less provocative? How could this be construed in any way as “taking sides”? Are the Chinese really so thin-skinned that they object to us even SPEAKING about the SCS issue?
Let me remind you that the PCA was the same court that ruled in favor of our dispute with Malaysia over Pedra Branca. So what would the implication be if we supported the PCA ruling for ourselves, but turned a blind eye to its ruling over the SCS? International law for me, but not for thee?
Note also that Singapore was not alone: Vietnam, Myanmar, and Malaysia also positively acknowledged or outright supported the ruling of the PCA. Why did we deserve to be singled out for coercion?
Non-alignment/neutrality is a PREFERENCE. It is not a solution. Singapore cannot prosper and be secure simply by pursuing a “hiding” strategy of laying low and hoping not to be noticed. I will be happy to elaborate if you disagree. We host the US military because we consider it productive to our security interests (and that of regional security) for America to maintain a regional presence. This is to provide a counterweight to China and give us strategic space to maneuver. It is NOT to contain China or obstruct its rise.

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And while we are on the subject, we should note that the US military only maintains a purely rotational presence in Singapore. There are NO permanent US military bases or assets stationed here. The naval base which their aircraft carrier uses belongs to us. We should also further note that Singapore has NO formal treaty of alliance with America. In fact it is rumored that in 2003 America offered us the status of a major non-NATO ally - a formal security commitment from the US to defend Singapore…and we rejected them. Now, is that how we would behave if we were really American proxies?
“I am non-aligned in the sense that I do not want to be involved in power blocs…but when my security, Singapore’s survival, Singapore’s prosperity is threatened, I cannot be neutral” - Lee Kuan Yew
“Singapore has to take the world as it is, it is too small to change it. But we can try to maximise the space we have to maneuver among the big ‘trees’ in the region” - Lee Kuan Yew, One Man’s View of the World, 2013
MYTH 5: Kishore claimed that “now that LKY is no longer with us, we should change our behaviour significantly…we should be very restrained in commenting on matters involving Great Powers”. I agree with him that we should be circumspect, pragmatic, even cold-blooded, when it comes to dealing with Great Powers. We must tread carefully.
But has there been any fundamental change in Singapore’s policy toward China post-LKY? No. Our relationship with the US goes back to the 1990s. Likewise with China we have always (and I emphasize, we CONTINUE to) promote the engagement of China with the region and the world. China must come to terms with the world order, just as the world order must accommodate China.
The Chinese like to grumble about the good old days of LKY and how well he got along with them. Again, they are not wrong. But this is a form of historical cherry-picking, of selective memory. Remember that LKY was one of the only Asian leaders to go up against a CCP-backed communist united front and win. Remember also that Mao’s China issued frequent propaganda proclamations labelling him a “running dog” of the West.
Lee Kuan Yew’s views on China were not one-dimensional. They were complex and nuanced. They were tactful, yes, but honest and direct. He did not shy away from political incorrectness.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CB4NwQ24Mpk
“The Chinese may make a miscalculation…they may become assertive and pushy, which is contrary to their long-term interest, which is to win over the smaller countries in the south to their side” - Lee Kuan Yew, 2011
“[My uncle-in-law] had this romantic idea that, you know, [China] is a land of my forefathers. I have no doubts that the land of my forefathers would have brought me down in the world…They (the Chinese) wanted me to contribute [to my uncle-in-law’s manor house which the Chinese refurbished and made into a historic tourist site]. I said no, no, I’m not Chinese, I’m Singaporean, I’m not going to visit the place…I have no romantic view about where I sprang from. I’m very grateful that my great grandmother who was born here decided she’s not going to go back (to China) with her husband because she doesn’t know China…I’m a lucky fellow. Yes, we are all lucky fellows. But the older generation has this romantic idea…I discovered when I was a student in England, that I had more in common with the Singaporeans and Malaysians of other races than with the Chinese from China because they are completely different. Their dress, their manners, their language. They are a different lot, that’s all. They come from a different society. Of course, at the end of the day they are Chinese.” -Lee Kuan Yew, Hard Truths, 2011
“That romantic idea of going back to the bosom of your motherland is a delusion. We have become different, that’s all. You can go back to China, you’re still different…If you go to China, I don’t think you will belong. They’ll say okay, we’ll accept you. But look at even the Malayan communist cadres who sent their families and children there…- nevertheless, they were treated differently…You think you’re Chinese , and that you will blend in, but you will not. You are already different. We are already different. Just like the American and the British people, or for that matter, the South African whites, Australians, New Zealanders and the British. The Taiwanese mainlanders and Chinese mainlanders, who have not stayed in Taiwan, yes, they are same stock, same heritage, but had different exposure, different standpoints, different views of the world. Are we Chinese? Yes, ethnically. Can we sit down with the Chinese and really feel part of them? Not possible. Because you speak Chinese? No. Your major premises are in your mind” - Lee Kuan Yew, Hard Truths, 2011
“[The Chinese] expect us to be more respectful - you must respect me. They tell us countries big or small are equal, we’re not a hegemon, 不称霸. But when we do something they don’t like, they say you have made 1.3 billion people unhappy … So please know your place” - Lee Kuan Yew, Hard Truths, 2011
“I do not see Singapore surviving on the Chinese economy. If we spoke only Chinese, we would not be today’s Singapore. What is the difference if China is ten times stronger? It will make us ten times stronger? No. Our prosperity comes from linkages with the world…the future is the same. We are not Hainan Island. We are not Hong Kong, where they have no choice. We are in the centre of an archipelago of great diversity, with rich natural resources, and the world will come here” - Lee Kuan Yew, One Man’s View of the World, 2013
“How can [the Chinese object to the American logistics hub here]? That is crude. If they ask us to stop the logistics base, our answer would be: you can use the logistics base and store your equipment here (so we would host both the Chinese and Americans” - Lee Kuan Yew, One Man’s View of the World, 2013
“Singapore is quite comfortable with the Americans being present. We do not know how brash or assertive China will become. When I said in 2009 that we must balance China, they translated the word in Chinese into ‘conscribe’, and there was a big uproar among their netizens, who asked how dare I say that when I am Chinese. They are hypersensistive” - Lee Kuan Yew, One Man’s View of the World, 2013
“You have to accept the fact that they (China) are the biggest boy in the neighbourhood. They will not be the biggest in the Pacific because the US will always be there to counterbalance them. But increasingly, they would be able to keep the US away from the coastal regions. That’s a development we have to accept. No more [uncomfortable for Singapore] than for the other countries…It’s even more tricky for Vietnam. We have no conflict of interest with China…we have no such overlapping claims with them.” - Lee Kuan Yew, One Man’s View of the World, 2013
CONCLUSION
Let me emphasize again: I see the rise of China as a good thing in the long-term. It is not an ABSOLUTE good, but it is good. China is a FRIEND, even if friends can be pushy at times and we do not always agree with our friends about everything all the time. Singapore and China have no fundamental clash of core interests. Indeed, I think it is possible for our core interests to align with China. Not only with China, but also with the US, India, Japan, etc. Whether or not it aligns with China to a greater degree than with other powers is to be seen, and in large part decided, by China’s own behaviour.
But in any case if there is alignment, our lodestar must always be our NATIONAL INTEREST - Singapore’s own national interest - determined by Singaporeans’ own choices ALONE and no one else’s, undiluted by the manipulation of ANY foreign entity. And in case you think I’m only referring to China, go look at our handling of the 1988 Hendrickson Affair.
Huang Jing was only one manifestation of this. Foreign powers will continue to attempt to influence our policy. When they stick their fingers into our sovereign discursive space, we must continue to quietly, tactfully, but ruthlessly slice those fingers off.
伤其十指 不如断其一指
防人之心 不可无
EDIT: someone anonymous gilded me! Thank you so much!! I am really honored haha
EDIT 2: Platinum? Thanks so much anonymous! You are too kind!! I don’t even know what to do with it
EDIT 3: Posted in geopolitics. Prepared to be attacked by angry Chinese redditors https://www.reddit.com/geopolitics/comments/g7muc9/on_chinese_influence_operations_in_singapore/
EDIT 4: The post is back up on Quora again. Seems like moderators revised their earlier decision
submitted by ned_stark97 to singapore [link] [comments]

Mi muy subjetivo top 10 de películas relacionadas con los mercados financieros

Hola a todos, comparto a continuación mi muy subjetivo top 10 de películas relacionadas con el mercado financiero.
1. Inside Job (2010): Documental de la crisis financiera del 2008. Tema muy cubierto por diferentes obras, sin embargo este documental resalta pues repasa uno por uno de los participantes de la crisis, compradores de casas, bancos originadores, calificadoras, FED, etc.
2. Enron: The smartest guys in the room (2005): Documental que narra el escándalo de Enron, así como los orígenes del mismo. Intereses desalineados, pobre regulación, libertades en contabilidad financiera, egos, cultura corporativa tóxica, etc.
3. Margin Call (2012): Película que narra los días previos de que la crisis del 2008 estallara, esto desde la perspectiva de la banca de inversión y participantes de la misma de distintos rangos, desde el analista, el quant, el director de riesgos, hasta el CEO. Película que no tiene la fama que se merece.
4. Trading places (1983): Comedia que narra la historia de un trader de commodities y un indigente que intercambian lugares para conocer las aptitudes de uno y otro cuando sus entornos son cambiados. Manera entretenida de conocer cómo funcionaban y hasta cierto punto siguen funcionando los mercados de futuros.
5. Other people’s money (1991): Comedia acerca de un active investor que se dedica a comprar compañías subvaluadas y revenderlas en partes para obtener una utilidad. Muestra como en ocasiones la obtención de utilidades no va necesariamente de la mano con el valor generado por una empresa. Creo que se vuelve ahora más relevante con el incremento notable de leveraged buyouts en el mundo.
6. Wall Street (1987): Tal vez la película más famosa del tema. Narra los inicios de un corredor de bolsa y sus deseos de convertirse en una leyenda como su mentor: Gordon Gekko. Vale la pena simplemente por el discurso de “greed is good”.
7. The Big Short (2015): Basado en el libro del mismo nombre, narra en primer lugar los motivos que originaron la crisis del 2008, y posteriormente narra, el cómo un puñado de inversionistas fueron capaces de verla y obtener provecho de ella.
8. Rogue Trader (1999): Narra la historia de Nick Leeson y de cómo sus operaciones en el mercado de derivados llevaron a la quiebra a Barings Bank. En otras palabras, el trader que hizo quebrar el banco más antiguo del mundo.
9. Boiler Room (2000): Probablemente una de las películas que se ven más anticuadas de la lista, a pesar de no ser la más vieja. Esto pues prácticamente todo lo que aparece ahí ya no existe, venta de acciones por teléfono, pocas fuentes de información para corroborar la información, poca regulación, etc. Por lo anterior, es que creo que vale la pena ver, pues te da la oportunidad de conocer un mundo que ya no existe y que sin embargo hace no mucho así era.
10. Barbarians at the gate (1993): La película no tiene mucha calidad en su producción (fue hecha para televisión), sin embargo está basada en el libro del mismo nombre que es sin duda uno de los mejores libros de finanzas corporativas. Narra la puja por el control de Nabisco entre su CEO y KKR. Interesante pues narra la primer gran transacción de LBOs, junk bonds, corporate takeovers, etc.
Películas que no entraron a mi lista:
The Wolf of Wall Street: Es una película entretenida con grandes actuaciones, sin embargo, creo que tiene mucha ficción (la historia real no se asemeja ni a la película ni al libro) por lo que creo que no es representativa del mercado y solo refuerza viejos clichés.
Blue Jasmine: Tal vez sería la mejor película de la lista, sin embargo, el tema central no es un tema del mercado financiero, sino de lo que pasa después de ese gran evento trascendental, pues la historia se basa en la vida de la ex esposa de Bernie Maddoff, después de que el fraude piramidal del mismo se derrumba y derrumba con eso la vida de su familia.
Bonus
Serie Billions: Narra el día a día de Bobby Axelroad (fundador de uno de los principales Hedge Funds) y de su constante búsqueda de retornos en el mercado sin importar los medios que tenga que utilizar, así como de su relación con el resto del mercado, reguladores, entes regales, competidores etc. Excelente serie de drama, visualmente exquisita y con buen balance entre meter conceptos técnicos, más no complicados, para que pueda ser disfrutada tanto por gente del medio como gente ajena a él. Único contra que le veo, es que en ocasiones la resolución de conflictos para dar continuidad a la trama es bastante simplista.

Sean libres de compartir cualquier opinión, desacuerdo, y sugerencias adicionales.
submitted by adanchalino to MexicoBursatil [link] [comments]

$850->40k->31k, and some gratitude

$850->40k->31k, and some gratitude
Been lurking on here for a while and finally got to a point where I thought I'd post my gains, most of which wouldn't have happened without this fucked up community. So before anything else, thanks for the advice, learning, and retarded-ass humor. Yeah I'm a simp fuck you
Started in late Feb during the airline/travel crash with $850; I accidentally diamond-handed on a cross country flight, made 500 bucks, and was.... intrigued. Also had puts on the airline I was flying which felt like living on the edge.
Long story short, I got serious, and by serious I mean reading the fucked up DD that was all over this sub. Also started learning about theta gang, only chucking around FD's when I was willing to lose the money, etc. Made it to around 15k and stagnated between that and ~10k for a while fucking around with AMZN FD's; finally got out of that with some dumb luck, TSLA, and FLIR calls. Passing 25k felt like an emancipation, but I quickly found out that the paper hands you get with unlimited day trades is risky as fuck. Started running the wheel on high dividend energy stocks and playing a stupid FD or two; made it to 40k largely on Amazon and Tesla calls, then went back down to 26k trying to catch the falling knife on both. Been crawling back up with theta and earnings plays and trying not to repeat my mistakes.

Long story short, these gains are small compared to the big fish on here, but they represent a whole new way of how I look at $, and a whole bunch of knowledge, stupid decisions, and good times that I wouldn't have had without this sub. So again, thanks a bunch.

I'll post again when I double it or lose it all.

Current positions: 8/21 TSLA 1600c, 8/21 AAPL $400c, 9/4 AUY $7c, 8/14 UPS $120c, a few OTM spy p hedges just cause im a pussy, then MPC and SLB shares para la THETA gainz.


https://preview.redd.it/h5b0zx98rhd51.png?width=750&format=png&auto=webp&s=4ded82dc0a331e594470008703286e7c9e59c011
submitted by surfbear415 to wallstreetbets [link] [comments]

Chainlink analysis - my thoughts and research

Necessary Disclaimer: no rule breaking intended. No price manipulation intended. I only want to share verifiable facts/links and my analysis. If I am doing anything against the rules please let me know and I will do my best to fix it ASAP. I trade crypto, including LINK, and I am currently short on LINK. This is not financial advice; this is just for my own record and to start a discussion for anyone who might want more transparency around LINK.

TL;DR:

I believe there is a lot of misinformation, uncertainty, and unanswered questions about the LINK token, the Chainlink ecosystem, the SmartContract parent company. I also believe that LINK's current price is unjustified based on fundamental factors like usage/business case/current customers/future potential. So I'm raising some points and asking some questions.
What is this post? Why should I care? How do I use it?
Read or skim it. It's about the LINK token, the Chainlink ecosystem, and the parent company SmartContract. It's about why I believe the price of the LINK token may be currently driven mostly by hype and not backed by standard market fundamentals like usage/economics.
Update 9 AUG: reorganizing, rewriting this post and moving supporting data/sources into "appendix" comments below on this post. The previous versions of this post and my comments elsewhere were too emotionally charged and caused more division rather than honest, evidence-based, productive discussion and I sincerely apologize for that. I have now rewritten it and will continue to update it.

PARTNERSHIPS

Who has Chainlink partnered with? Who is using Chainlink's technology and network? Who is contributing to developing Chainlink?
Google - this is the pinned tweet on Chainlink's official page. Nothing there about Google using Chainlink services or co-developing with them. Just that blockchains/oracles CAN use google cloud services (APIs?). This is Google Cloud's June 13, 2019 blog post: https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/data-analytics/building-hybrid-blockchain-cloud-applications-with-ethereum-and-google-cloud
Oracle - (TODO. This seems to have potential as some product manager at Oracle has posted that chainlink integration is coming Q3/Q4 of 2020)
SWIFT - the best they've got is a 30 second video with NOBODY from SWIFT present, with a *hypothetical* use case using SWIFT API.
Intel This is the only google result for "chainlink site:intel.com", and it casually mentions that Intel's TEE (trusted execution environment) technology can be used to improve the security of oracles/blockchains. Nothing about Intel themselves using or developing with Chainlink. https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/articles/new-confidential-computing-solutions-emerge-on-the-hyperledger-avalon-trusted-compute.html
Another 240+ claimed project integrations:
[TODO] There are so many to keep track of. Every week or even more frequent is yet another integration *announcement*
Current DeFi usage: we've heard that Chainlink "secures" $1 billion in DeFi. But that's not in value locked: https://defipulse.com/ (LINK doesn't even appear on that list). That's just with DeFi data supposedly being priced using Chainlink nodes.
EG Synthetix:
https://blog.synthetix.io/chainlink-decentralizes-first-wave-of-synthetix-price-feeds/ yet where does Synthetix actually PAY to use an oracle? Not visible on-chain, maybe someone will find it.
https://defipulse.com/blog/3-defi-dapps-starting-2020-off-strong/ "... Chainlink's following includes partnerships big and small, including Intel and Google Cloud services" example of misleading/exaggerated partnership claims being circulated.

Chainlink's ROADMAP

Threshold signatures, staking, on-chain SLAs:
How real are these, is there a roadmap, how will this benefit users, is there any evidence of users currently *wanting* to use chainlink but needing these features and actively waiting for Chainlink to launch these?
Staking: for there to be a valid incentive for users to stake LINK, it has to return around 5% annually because anything substantially under that would have users putting their money elsewhere (https://www.stakingrewards.com/cryptoassets) (not counting speculative capital gains in terms of LINK's price, but price gain per token/coin applies to all other crypto projects as well).
Currently, for stakable cryptos, around 30-80% of their total supply is staked, and a good adjusted reward is on the order of 5% as well (some actually negative, some 10%+). The promise of staking incentivises people to buy and hold more LINK tokens (again, many other crypto projects have staking already live). That 5% reward will ultimately have to come from the customers who pay Chainlink oracle nodes to use their services, so it's an extra 5% fee for them. Of course, in the near future, the staking rewards *could* be subsidized by the founders' reserve wallets.
Threshold signatures: addressed below in a comment.
On-chain SLAs: [TODO]
Here's supposedly Chainlink's agile/project planning board. (TODO: verify that it is indeed Chainlink's, and then analyse it)
https://www.pivotaltracker.com/n/projects/2129823

LINK wallet addresses

As LINK is an ERC20 token on the Ethereum blockchain, all its movements are visible, all the way from the genesis creation of 1,000,000,000 LINK tokens through to aggregator nodes through to cashing out on exchanges. Below are some examples and some reasons why this may be concerning to investors/holders of LINK.
This is one LINK address whale with over 6 million LINK. Looks like some of the funds end up on a Turkish exchange Paribu. https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0xc6bed363b30df7f35b601a5547fe56cd31ec63da This wallet has moved out >200,000 LINK in the last 24 hours. Don't know where, go trace it.
Typical data provider example. Lots of named Chainlink oracle nodes pay this address: https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0x72f3dff4cd17816604dd2df6c2741e739484ca62 Usually 0.16 LINK to this address every few minutes, sometimes 2 LINK. This data provider has sent out ~11,620 LINK out to the following wallet: https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0xa5d0084a766203b463b3164dfc49d91509c12dab That wallet has cashed out 9,560 LINK to 1inch.exchange (a DEX) over the past year. Has also transferred 6000 LINK to a currently loaded wallet (possibly exchange account ready to sell?): https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0x088d50c0bb5381a1205d1182cc21496c6fdc4c62 Another destination accumulation wallet (~493,000 LINK with no out transfers yet) https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0x7758e507850da48cd47df1fb5f875c23e3340c50 (unrelated but a sell order of this size would drop LINK's price by 10-30% on Binance, someone check my maths on this) Now tracing back who funds the 0x72f3... data provider, we see a number of named Chainlink Aggregator nodes. Picking one at random, say the TUSD/ETH one: https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0x73ead35fd6a572ef763b13be65a9db96f7643577 It was last funded March 12 2020 with 5000 LINK. Tracing back the funds we ultimately come to the genesis wallet of the Chainlink network itself, the original source of the 1,000,000,000 LINK tokens in existence. (side note: some interesting-looking transactions there) This is the first child of the genesis wallet that received 100,000,000 from the genesis wallet. https://etherscan.io/tokentxns?a=0xf37c348b7d19b17b29cd5cfa64cfa48e2d6eb8db Last time this wallet transferred out was YESTERDAY for 500,000 LINK. Now this doesn't prove anything, DYOR, but to me it looks like the genesis wallets are slowly cashing out through the aggregator nodes, making it look like the oracle node network is being actively used (which it is, but it's not the end customers like AAVE/NEXO paying the LINK required to power oracles, it's SmartContract itself). I know that this is just ONE aggregator node, but I've seen the same behaviour from their other named nodes - go check for yourselves.
If you trace chainlink oracle funds to their source, you can find some of the original addresses. Some of these early on (around 1000 days ago) were linked to AfroDex labs, which looks like now doesn’t work. http://afrodex.net/#!/trade/AfroX-ETH
Who currently pays Chainlink nodes?
How much of the revenue that Chainlink nodes receive is from potentially third party customers vs internal funding by the Chainlink team wallets?
For example, this is the "Chainlink: LINK / USD Aggregator" wallet.
It has had a total 8,200 LINK deposited from 5 transactions in round amounts (on any of the below links, click the "Analytics" tab to see In/Out balance history), and has so far paid out ~5,156 LINK.
https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0x32dbd3214ac75223e27e575c53944307914f7a90
It typically pays ~10 wallets 0.16 Link each, a few times an hour, like so:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x02c595981b935a57cfbe6170656181faac9a16d7a33a123930a716c4abec615a ($45 in ETH fees to transfer $22 worth of LINK, sounds like a lot of overheads)
Where does this aggregator wallet get its LINK funding from?
From ONLY here: https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0x27158157136384c713bc09a0a7ae81c8391d7f11 (current net balance ~50,000 LINK, total ~5,000,000 million in and out)
Which in turn gets it from ONLY these three, in HUGE amounts:
https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0xf37c348b7d19b17b29cd5cfa64cfa48e2d6eb8db (6,000,000 LINK)
https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0xaf40738c6f940519516e043f924b8d05fc0292b8 (just a jump address into the one above, only 3 total tx)
https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0x1f9e26f1c050b5c018ab0e66fcae8e4394eb0165 (147,000 LINK)
the 0x1f9e2... one got its funding from:
  1. 6098.8 LINK from Binance about a year ago: https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0x161cdd891e04a77e0458a3ef65c563c4d2064cd6
  2. 12,600,000 from the genesis wallet through one jump address https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0xdad22a85ef8310ef582b70e4051e543f3153e11f
  3. 13,000,000 from the 0xf37... wallet above
the 0xf37... in turn got its 50,000,000 (!) LINK from the genesis address which minted the original 1 billion tokens:
https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0xf55037738604fddfc4043d12f25124e94d7d1780
So the 0x27158... wallet is basically a genesis wallet.
Now let's do the most popular feed on feeds.chain.link, the ETH/USD feed: https://feeds.chain.link/eth-usd, with a wallet address of: https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0xF79D6aFBb6dA890132F9D7c355e3015f15F3406F#tokenAnalytics
It was first funded in Jan 2020 and has been funded a total of 9 times for a total influx of 108,437.533 LINK, by:
  1. "Chainlink: Deployer" 10 LINK: https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0x6f61507f902e1c22bcd7aa2c0452cd2212009b61
  2. The 0x27158... genesis-sourced wallet, 20,000 LINK
  3. An intermediary/middle very active wallet (which is 99.998% funded by the 0x27158... genesis-sourced wallet), 52,000 LINK https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0x2f0acb9c5dd2a3511bc1d9d67258e5c9434ba569
  4. "Chainlink: Aggregator", 36,427.533 LINK, https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0x79febf6b9f76853edbcbc913e6aae8232cfb9de9#tokenAnalytics
I manually traced EVERY single inbound transaction/source of funds for the above 4 (not counting #1 as 10 LINK is negligible). 2 & 3 are 99.99%+ genesis-funded, being ACTIVELY topped up by a genesis wallet, last tx 4 days ago, 500,000 LINK. #4 has been funded 36 times over the past year and a half (that's 36 manual exports and I did them all). They all come from the 0x27158..., 0x2f0acb..., and https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0x1f9e26f1c050b5c018ab0e66fcae8e4394eb0165 (another address like the 0x2f0acb that I went through and checked EVERY SINGLE inbound source of funds, and it's also >99.9% genesis-funded - one tx from Binance for 6098 LINK out of a total ~6,560,000 inbound LINK from genesis wallets), and two other addresses linked to Binance (0x1b185c8611d157a67d9a9d5261b0d2bd52c0bb78, 10,000 LINK and 0x039ac18afe298747c51c85e7c8f0d67c327f3883, 1,000,000 LINK)
The 0x039ac... address funded the "Chainlink: Aggregator" address with 127,900 LINK, and the 0x1b185... with about ~9,600 LINK). So yes, it's technically possible that someone not related to Chainlink paid for the ETH / USD price feed because some funds do come from Binance. However, they only come from two distinct addresses. Surely for "240+" claimed partnerships, more than TWO would pay to use Chainlink's MOST POPULAR price feed? That is, unless they don't pay directly but to another address and then Chainlink covers this one from their own wallets. I will check if that's in line with Chainlink's whitepaper, but doesn't that throw doubt on the whole model of end-users paying to use oracles/aggregators, even if it's subsidized?
I provide you this much detail not to bore you but to show you that I went through BY HAND and checked every single source (detailed sources in Appendix B) of funds for the OFFICIAL, Chainlink-listed "ETH/USD" aggregator that's supposedly sponsored by 10 DeFi partners (Synthetix, LoopSpring, OpenLaw, 1inch, ParaSwap, MCDEX, FuturesSwap, DMM, Aave, The Force Protocol). Yet where are the transactions showing that those 10 partners have EVER paid for this ETH/USD oracle? Perhaps the data is there so what am I missing? This ETH/USD aggregator has transferred out ~76,000 LINK to I guess the data providers in increments of .33 LINK. It has 21 data providers responding. I will begin investigating the data providers themselves soon.
And those middle addresses like 0x1f9e26... and 0x2f0acb...? They have transferred out hundreds of thousands if not millions of LINK to exchanges. And that's just ONE price pair aggregator. Chainlink has around 40 of these (albeit this one's one of the more popular ones).

SNX / ETH aggregator is funded 100% by genesis-sourced wallets, only 3 inbound transactions:
https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0xe23d1142de4e83c08bb048bcab54d50907390828

Some random examples (for later, ignore these for now) ***********
https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0x039ac18afe298747c51c85e7c8f0d67c327f3883 bought 1,000,000 LINK from Binance in Sept 12 & 15, 2019. (one of the possible funding sources for the ETH / USD aggregator example above)
This address got 500,000 LINK from 0x27158... and has distributed them into ~5-10,000 LINK wallets that haven't had any out transactions yet
https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0x5bcf3edc0bb7119e35f322ba40793b99d4620f1e
**************
Another example with an unnamed aggregator-node-like wallet that was only spun up 5 days ago, Aug 5:
https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0x2cbfd29947f774b8cf338f776915e6fee052f236
It was funded 2,000 LINK SOLELY by the 0x27158... wallet and has so far paid out ~500 LINK in 0.43 LINK amounts to 9 wallets at a time. For example, this is one of the wallets it cashes out to:
https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0x64fe692be4b42f4ac9d4617ab824e088350c11c2#tokenAnalytics
That wallet extremely consistently collects small amounts of LINK since Oct 2019. It must be a data provider because a lot of Chainlink named wallets pay it small amounts of LINK regularly. It has transferred out 20 times. The most recent transfer out:
https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0xc8c30fa803833dd1fd6dbcdd91ed0b301eff87cf which then immediately transferred to the named "1inch.exchange" wallet, so I assume this was a "cash-out" transaction. It has cashed out via this address a lot.
Granted, it also has transfer-out transactions that haven't (yet) ended up in an exchange wallet, eg https://etherscan.io/token/0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca?a=0x88e5353a73f38f25a9611e6083de6f361f9b537b with a current balance of 3000 LINK. This could be a user's exchange wallet, ready to be sold, or could be something else. No way for me to tell as there are no out txs from it.

LINK overall transaction, volume, and tx fees

This is to understand how much $ moves through the LINK ecosystem through: nodes, data providers, reserve wallets, wallets linked to exchanges, others.
A typical aggregator node tx (payout?): https://etherscan.io/tx/0xef9e8e6dd94ebe9bbac8866f18c2ea0a07408ced1aa77fa04826043eaa55e772 This is their ETH/USD aggregator paying out 1 LINK to each of 21 addresses. Value of 21 LINK ~= $210. Total eth tx fees: .233 ETH (~$88.5, ~42% of the total tx value. If LINK was $4.2 instead of $10, the tx fees would be 100% of the value of the tx). Transactions like this happen every few minutes, and the payout amounts are most often 0.16, 0.66, 1.0, and 2.0 Link.
Chainlink’s node/job listing site, https://market.link, lists 86 nodes, 195 feeds, 801 jobs, ~1,080,000 job runs (I can’t tell if this is over the past 2 months or 1.5 years). Only 20 nodes have over 1000 job runs, and 62 nodes have ZERO runs. Usual job cost is listed as 0.1 link, but the overall payout to the nodes is 10-20 times this. The nodes then cash out usually through a few jump addresses to exchanges. Some quick maths: (being generous and assuming it’s 1mil jobs every 2 months = ~6mil link/year = $60,000,000 revenue a year. This is the most generous estimate towards link’s valuation I’ve found so far. If we ignore the below examples where on multi-node payouts the tx fees are more than the node revenue itself, then it’s almost in line with an over-valued (but real) big tech company.
For example, one of the latest CHF/USD job runs paid 0.1 LINK to 9 addresses (data providers?) - total $14.4 payout - and paid 0.065 ETH ($24.5) in fees. That’s a $10.1 LOSS on a $14.4 revenue: https://etherscan.io/tx/0xa6351bab810b6864bfebb0f6e1e3bde3c8856f8aac3ba769dd2e6d1a39c0d23f
Linkpool’s (one of the biggest node operators) “ETH-USD CryptoCompare” job costs 0.1 link and has 33 runs in the past 24 hours (once every ~44min), total ~78,000 runs since May 30 2019 (once every ~8min). https://market.link/jobs/64bb0845-c4e1-4681-8853-0b5aa7366101/runs (PS cryptocompare has a free API that does this. Not sure why it costs $1 at current link prices to access an API once)

Token distribution:

Top 100 wallets (0.05% of ~186,000 total) hold 83% of tokens. 8 wallets each hold over 1% of total, 58 hold over 0.1%. Of these 58, 9 are named exchange/lending pool wallets.
For comparison, for Tether (TUSD), the top 100 wallets (0.006% of ~1,651,000 total) hold 35.9% of the supply. 3 addresses hold over 1% of the supply and 135 hold over 0.1%. Of these 135, at least 15 are named exchange/lending pool wallets.
LINK’s market cap is $3.5B (or $10B fully diluted, if we count the foundedev-controlled tokens, which we should as there's nothing preventing them from being moved at a moment's notice). Tether’s is $6.9B. Tether has 10 times more addresses and less distribution inequality. Both LINK and Tether are ERC20 tokens, and even if we temporarily ignore any arguments related to management/roadmap/teams etc, Tether has a clear, currently functional, single use case: keep 1 USDT = $1 USD by printing/burning USDT (and yet as of April 2019, only 74% of Tether's market cap is backed by real funds - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tether_(cryptocurrency))). Given that Chainlink's market cap is now 50% bigger than Tether's, surely by now there's AT LEAST one clear, currently functional use case for LINK? What is it? Can we *see* it happening on-chain?

Chainlink’s actual deliverable products

"What do I currently get for my money if I buy LINK 1) as an investor and 2) as a tech business/startup thinking of using oracles?”
Codebase (Chainlink’s github has around 140-200,000 lines of code (not counting html/css). What else is not counted in this? Town crier? Proprietary code that we don't know about yet? How much CODING has Chainlink done other than what's on github?
Current network of oracles - only ~20 active nodes - are there many more than the ones listed on market.link and reputation.link? If so, would be nice to know about these if we're allowed!
Documentation - they have what seems like detailed instructions on how to launch and use oracle nodes (and much more, I haven't investigated yet) (TODO this part more - what else do they offer to me as an end consumer, and eg as a tech startup needing oracle services that I can’t code myself?)

Network utilization statistics:

Etherscan.io allows csv export of the first 5000 txs from each day. From Jul 31 to Aug 6 2020, I thus downloaded 30,000 tx from midnight every day to an average of 7:10am (so 24 hour totals are 3.34x these numbers if we assume the same network utilization throughout the day).
(Summary of all LINK token activity on the ETH blockchain from 31.07 to 06.08, first 5000 txs of each day (30k total) shown Appendix A comment below this post.)
If we GENEROUSLY assume that EVERY SINGLE transaction under 10.0 LINK is ACTUAL chainlink nodes doing ACTUAL work, that’s still under 0.1% of the LINK network’s total volume being used for ACTUAL ecosystem functioning. The rest is speculation, trading, node funding by foundedev wallets, or dumping to exchanges (anything I missed?)
Assuming the above, the entire turnover of the actual LINK network is currently (18,422 LINK) * ($10/LINK) * (3.34 as etherscan.io’s data only gives first 5000 tx per day which averages to 7:10am) * (52 wk/year) = USD $31,995,329 turnover a year.
Note: the below paragraph is old analysis using traditional stock market Price/Earnings ratios which several users have now pointed out isn't really applicable in crypto. I leave it for the record. Assuming all of that is profit (which it’s not given tx fees at the very least), LINK would need a PE ratio (Price/Earnings) of 100 times to justify its current (undiluted) valuation of $3.5 billion of 300 if you count the other 65% of tokens that haven’t been dumped by the founders/devs yet. For comparison, common PE ratios are 32 (facebook), 29 (google), 37 (uber), 20 (twitter on a good year), 10 (good hedge fund returning 10% annual).

Thoughts on DeFi & yield-farming - [TODO]

Why would exchanges who do their due diligence list LINK, let alone at a leverage? 1) that's their business, they take a cut of every transaction, overhyped or not, 2) they're not safe from listing openly bearish tokens like EIDOS (troll token that incentivized users to make FAKE transactions, response to EOS) https://www.coindesk.com/defi-yield-farming-comp-token-explained
The current ANNUAL yield on liquidity/yield farming is something like 2% on STABLE tokens like USDC and TETHER which at least have most of their supply backed by real-world assets. If Chainlink LINK staking is to be successful, they'll have to achieve at LEAST that same 2% at end-state. IF LINK is in bubble territory and drops, that's a lot of years at 2% waiting to recoup losses.

SmartContract Team & Past Projects

Normally I don't like focussing on people because it leads too easily to ad-hominem attacks on personality rather than on technology/numbers as I've done above, but I came across this and didn't like what I saw.
Steve Ellis, SmartContract's current CTO, co-founded and worked in "Secure Asset Exchange" from 2014 to 2016. They developed the NXT blockchain, issued 1,000,000,000 NXT tokens (remind you of anything?), NXT was listed end of 2013 and saw 3 quick 500%-1000% pumps and subsequent dumps in early in mid 2014, and then declined to . SecureAE officially shut down in Jan 2016. Then at some point a company called Jelurida acquired the rights to NXT (presumably after SecureAE?), then during the 2017 altcoin craze NXT pumped 300 times to a market cap of $1.8 BILLION and then dumped back down 100 times and now it's a dead project with a market cap of $13 million.
https://www.linkedin.com/in/steveellis0606/
https://trade.secureae.com/
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/nxt/
https://www.jelurida.com/news/lawsuit-against-apollo-license-violations
As an investor or business owner, would you invest/hire a company whose co-founders/CTO's last project was a total flop with a price history chart that's textbook pump-and-dump behaviour? (and in this case, we KNOW the end result - 99% losses for investors) If you're Google/Oracle/SWIFT/Intel, would you partner with them?

Open questions for the Chainlink community and investors:

  1. Network activity: Are there any other currently active chainlink nodes other than those listed on market.link and reputation.link? If so, is there a list of them with usage statistics? Do they use some other token than LINK and thus making simple analytics of the LINK ERC20 token not an accurate representation of Chainlink’s actual activity? If the nodes listed on the two sites above ARE currently the main nodes, then
  2. PR, partnership announcements: Why is the google tweet still pinned to the top of Chainlink’s twitter? Due to the frequently circulated Chainlink promotion material (https://chainlinkecosystem.com/) that lists Google as one of the key partners, this tweet being pinned is potentially misleading as there isn't anything in there to merit calling Google a "collaborator" or "partner" - just that blockchains/oracles *can* use Google's APIs (but so can most software in the world). Is there something else going on with the SmartContract-Google relationship that warrants calling Google a partner that we're simply not aware of yet?
  3. By buying LINK, what backs YOUR money: If you have bought and currently hold LINK tokens, how comfortable are you that the future promise of your investment growing is supported on verifiable business and technological grounds versus pure, parabolic hype? If after reading this post you still are, I kindly ask you to reply and show how even one of the points I provided is either incorrect or not applicable, and I will edit my post and include your feedback in the relevant section as I have already done from other users.
  4. What have I missed? Of course not 100% of what I've said is infallible truth. I am a real human, and I have plenty of biases and blind spots. Even if what I've provided is technically correct, there may be other much more important info that I've missed that eclipses what I've provided here. Ask yourself: if the current hype around LINK is indeed valid and points to a $100/$1000 future LINK price, then Where’s Chainlink’s missing financial/performance/usage evidence to justify LINK’s current valuation of $10+?

Conclusion

For your consideration, I have provided evidence with links that you can follow and verify, and draw your own conclusions. I have made my case as to why I believe the LINK token is currently priced much higher than evidence supports, and I ask you to peer-review my analysis and share your thoughts with me and with the wider LINK/crypto community.
Thank you for your time, I realize this is a long post. All questions and feedback welcome, feel free to comment or PM. I won't delete/censoblock (except for personal threats, safety considerations etc). I am a real human but I am not revealing my true identity for obvious privacy/harassment reasons.
(If anyone is wondering about my credentials ability to add 2+2 and work with basic spreadsheets: I have previously won a math competition in a USA state, I won an English-speaking country's physics olympiad, my university education is in mathematical physics/optimization engineering, and I worked for a few years in a global manufacturing company doing data analytics, obviously I'm not posting my CV here to verify that but I promise you it's the truth)
I’m not looking to spread neither FUD, nor blind faith, nor pure hype, and I want an honest transparent objective discussion. I personally believe more that LINK is overvalued, but my beliefs have evolved and may continue to do so as I research more and understand more about Chainlink, LINK, Ethereum, DeFi, and other related topics, and as I incorporate YOUR feedback. If you think I haven't disclosed something, ask.
As always, this is not financial advice and I am not liable for anything that may happen as a result of you reading this!
submitted by Stratocatter to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

Como escolher um ETF?

Gostava de saber qual é o método que usam para escolher um ETF.
No meu portfólio tenho dois ETFs, um que segue um índice mundial (IWDA) e outro de bonds (DBZB), mas escolhi esses porque várias pessoas que confio recomendaram e porque são acumlativos. No entanto, já vi outras opções muito parecidas e muitas vezes não sei que informações são relevantes para fazer um comparativo.
Obs.: O objetivo não é analisar os ETFs citados ou opções que escolheriam no lugar desses e sim entender o método que usam para escolher um ETF. Obrigado :)
submitted by simonveiga to literaciafinanceira [link] [comments]

Here's A to Z list of a *few* scams that happened since 2014 in India

Since today is my cake-day, I thought of posting something that got a lot of upvotes earlier on india.
Here's the full list of all the scams as listed on the site - corruptmodi.com from A-to-Z:
submitted by OMDB-PiLoT to india [link] [comments]

On Chinese influence operations in Singapore

Original post in singapore
I answered this question on Quora and it got a modestly significant number of views (about 50 upvotes). but it got removed by moderation, I don't know why. Probably because it upset some Chinese nationalists/pro-Chinese Quorans (Lin Xieyi comes to mind). As we all know, Reddit is a liberal Western echo chamber so I suppose my views will find some resonance here.
I posted it on Quora because I think it's important to debunk some of the ill-informed and simplistic opinions about Singapore's foreign policy toward China. There are too many of those kinds of people voicing those opinions there. And I think too many of our people are not sufficiently educated on our foreign policy positions. This has to change if we are to be immunized against influence operations.
I am neither pro-China nor anti-China. I am pro-Singapore.
https://www.quora.com/Do-Singaporeans-agree-with-the-ex-diplomat-that-China-is-exercising-influence-pressure-and-coercion-on-Singapore?q=do%20singpoareans%20agree%20with%20the%20ex-diplomat

Do Singaporeans agree with the ex-diplomat that China is exercising influence, pressure and coercion on Singapore?

At first I didn’t, or was undecided, but now I do.
If you are a PRC patriot, or are uncomfortable with speculation and insinuations, please stop reading now. It’s for your own good.
Let’s examine the source in question. Who was this “ex-diplomat”?
· Bilahari Kausikan was former Permanent Secretary of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs
· He has substantial experience in the foreign policy arena. I assume he might be privy to classified information which is withheld from our public.
· He is no longer a civil servant; he is a pensioner. As such, his views do NOT officially reflect those of the Singapore government.
· Despite this, his views hold substantial weight and are frequently published in the Straits Times (which, although not under direct govt control, toes the official line and operates under some form of para-state oversight)
· He has not been outright repudiated by other foreign policy elites (as was the case with Kishore Mahbubani). From this we may infer that his views resonate somewhat with the establishment, or our foreign policy orthodoxy
· There are some things which our government cannot publicly/officially state, out of prudence…by which I mean, complicating our relationships with certain powers
· It is possible that the government prefers to use “unofficial” means (such as retired civil servants) to clarify or rebut certain narratives
Now let’s examine the substance of his argument.
That China exercises influence, pressure and coercion on Singapore, is not surprising. What should be disturbing is the MEANS or the CHANNELS through which it deploys its influence. There are LEGITIMATE channels for interstate intercourse. These include diplomacy, state media, international aid etc. etc. It is entirely natural (whether it is fair or acceptable is a different debate) for Great Powers to leverage their superior political/economic/military resources to make smaller states comply with their wishes, whether through persuasion or coercion.
But Bilahari Kausikan’s concern is with the ILLEGITIMATE channels: covert influence operations. These are violations of Singapore’s sovereignty, albeit under the cover of plausible deniability. Influence operations fall under the purview of covert action, which is different from espionage - and far more insidious. Espionage seeks simply to steal information. Covert action is intended to influence events (for example, domestic politics or foreign policy) within a target nation-state to one’s own benefit
Now let me be clear: All Great Powers conduct influence operations and espionage. China is no exception. Neither is the US. And Singapore is not exempted from their attempts. Our response has been very even-handed.Examples of foreign interference in the course of history and in SingaporeAn American diplomat once tried to influence the 1988 Singapore General ElectionSingapore Protests U.S. 'Interference' After Diplomat WithdrawnRussia spy claims: US nabs Singapore centre research fellow
But this is not a valid excuse. People who employ this excuse are essentially saying “So what? everyone does it”. To quote the Chinese Ambassador’s response “I would say firstly that every country hopes to gain recognition and support for its development philosophy and foreign policies. In this sense, China is no different.” This is equivalent to arguing that wife-beating is acceptable, because many husbands beat their wives! The issue here is not that China or the US wants our support. The issue is the means by which they seek to procure our support.
American influence operations seek to impose a liberal-democratic ideology on Singapore. They are mostly ineffective because American notions of liberalism do not find much resonance among our public political consciousness. Nonetheless, these operations should be exterminated/neutralized whenever and wherever they are detected.
But Chinese influence operations are more dangerous and insidious because they seek to impose a CHINESE identity on multiracial Singapore. This is something much harder for our population to resist, particularly because our national identity is so young and malleable. The appeals of ethnicity and culture are primordial and enduring.

SPECULATION ON CHINA’S 2016-2017 INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN
In August, Huang Jing was exposed for giving “supposedly "privileged information" to a senior member of the LKY School, so it could be passed on to the Singapore Government. The information was duly conveyed by that senior member of the LKYSPP to very senior public officials who were in a position to direct Singapore's foreign policy”.
About 3 months later, LKYSPP Dean Kishore Mahbubani, who previously was a senior MFA diplomat (and presumably has contact with “very senior public officials who were in a position to direct Singapore’s foreign policy”), stepped down from his position. If you go on Youtube and watch the speeches and interviews he has been giving, he has become something of a hype-man advertising China’s rise.
I think we can put two and two together.
I do deeply respect Kishore Mahbubani. I think he is an intellectual worth reading and worth listening to. I have no doubt that he earnestly, sincerely believes in the views that he propounds. I definitely agree with many of his ideas about the rise of Asia and China. In fact, I will be buying his new book “Has China Won?”. But I also think some of his ideas regarding China lack nuance. Reality is often complex.
When Lin Xieyi speculated that Huang Jing was a US agent, this was Kausikan’s comment: “This is the sort of stuff we must expect, intended to confuse the issue. Some of it will come from the seemingly neutral or well-meaning or the naive or from those whom Lenin used to call 'useful idiots'”Ambassador-at-large, Bilahari Kausikan, scoffs at Quora user questioning who Huang Jing is working for
Kausikan shared more details on the Chinese influence campaign in this lecture, which I encourage all of you to watch:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZEploM2-ctw
If you don’t have time, I’ll summarize (tl;dr skip to the bolded italics):
When Singapore stood firm on its right to state its position on an issue of undoubted importance to us and to the region (South China Sea), the Chinese activated their influence apparatus and went into high gear to pressure the government - our government - to change position…
Not all influence operations pose the same degree of risk. The uniqueness of Beijing’s influence operations stems from China’s triple identities. And this prescribes three tracks on which China conducts its foreign policy and influence operations.
First, the PRC is a state like any other state, operating within a still largely Westphalian international order… On this first track of state-to-state relations, there’s nothing particularly unusual about what Beijing does, except the unusually assertive assertive behaviour of some Chinese diplomats of late, in countries as far-ranging as Malaysia, the PNG and Sweden.
Secondly, the PRC is not just any state, it’s also a Leninist state…and the characteristic modus operandi of a Leninist state is the United Front, which Mao Zedong called the CCP’s “magic weapon”… the main characteristic of a Leninist state is the total subordination of state and society to the interests of the Party, irrespective whether the Party’s interest is internal or external. And as such, the United Front represents a blurring of the distinction between domestic and foreign policies and a significant modification of the principle of non-interference that goes far beyond what is generally considered acceptable diplomatic practice.
Thirdly, the PRC is also a civilizational state: the embodiment and exemplar of millennia of the Chinese nation’s history and culture, now rejuvenated…and this identity as a civilizational state finds expression in the work of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office… In plain language, overseas Chinese should identify their interests with China’s interests and work to advance China’s interests. And this represents a deliberate blurring of the distinction made between the 华人 (ethnic Chinese) and the 华侨 (overseas PRC citizens)…
Now these 3 identities prescribe 3 tracks on which China conducts relationships. And taken holistically, they create a sophisticated and flexible instrument of influence that is far more effective than the conventional operations conducted by other countries. China’s influence operations are effective because the 3 tracks on which it operates makes it difficult to deal with or even grasp - even understand - in entirety.
On the first track of state-to-state relations, the usual tactics of persuasion, inducement or coercion may be deployed as appropriate, whether overtly through diplomacy or covertly through intelligence organizations. But the United Front may simultaneously operate to, for example, emphasize coercion or inducement even as the first track stresses persuasion. And the third civilizational track may conveniently wrap everything up in appeals to ethnic pride…Now the tendency of all governments and in particular foreign ministries is to focus on the first track of state-to-state relations and to want to keep them on an even keel…But this can all to easily lead to Chinese activities on the other two tracks being overlooked or downplayed.
[the narrative of China’s absolute rise and America’s inevitable decline] and others were propagated by various means: WeChat with Chinese-speaking populations, social and mainstream media, whispering campaigns, business, clan and cultural associations, as well as conventional agents of influence reporting to Chinese intelligence organizations who cultivate what Lenin called “useful idiots”.
It was difficult to pin down the precise origin of such narratives, but the messaging was to consistent, and too insistent, to be coincidental…many Singaporeans did not realize they were being fed oversimplifications and swallowed them whole or played along for other reasons. Businessmen, academics, and others with interests in China were given broad hints that their interests might suffer unless Singapore was more accommodating and passed the messages to the government…Appeals to ethnic pride were made to others. The aim was to instil a fatalistic acceptance of the inevitability and desirability of a Chinese identity for multiracial Singapore and get Singaporeans to pressure the government to align Singapore’s interests with China’s interest.
In any case and for whatever reason, the 2016–2017 Chinese influence operation was effective. The pressures on the government were great. It was very difficult to explain the somewhat abstract importance of UNCLOS or the nuances of our position on the South China Sea or the complications of our relationship with China to the general public, to whom the Chinese narratives were more easily understood. And it cannot be denied that ethnic appeals resonated strongly with a probably not insignificant section of our public.
It’s clear enough for whom Huang Jing worked. I told you he had dual US-PRC citizenship. In case you don’t know, holding dual citizenship is forbidden in China. Huang Jing today holds a senior academic position in China, apparently without sanction for holding American citizenship.
As the only majority ethnic Chinese sovereign state in the region, Singapore is a special case. A majority Chinese Singapore that nevertheless conducts an independent foreign policy may be something of an anomaly in Chinese eyes.
This is not the ravings of some conspiracy theorist. This is our former Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs speaking.

STRATEGIC NARRATIVES
What is a strategic narrative? A weaponized story.
In its influence campaigns against Singapore, the PRC advances a number of strategic narratives, all of which are, at best, questionable in their truthfulness. Sadly, some of our Singaporean Chinese compatriots sometimes buy into these narratives and even confidently echo them. Now, most of our population is only cursorily interested in foreign affairs and may find such superficial narratives plausible. This must change if they are to be immunized against these narratives.
This is a war of narratives. China cannot officially pressure us to choose sides. But they can paint a certain picture through unofficial channels and try to box us into a corner. They can try to tell us “See, this is what you are doing! Stop it!”. When they do that, we MUST push back by painting our own narratives and showing them that “no, actually we’re not doing that. We’re doing THIS”.
MYTH 1. Surely as a “Chinese country”, Singapore should “explain” China’s position (on the South China Sea and other issues) to the rest of Southeast Asia
MYTH 2. China is rising and US is declining; therefore we should bandwagon with China. You should get on the right side of history!
MYTH 3. If you are not with China, then you are against China! You are an American puppet/proxy, or, if you are ethnic Chinese, even worse - a race traitor!
MYTH 4. Singapore has no claims in the South China Sea, and purports to be a neutral/non-aligned country so why is it “taking sides” with the US against China by agreeing with the PCA ruling and hosting US naval assets?
MYTH 5. Unlike Lee Kuan Yew, the current PAP leadership under Lee Hsien Loong doesn’t know how to deal with China. Relations were sooooo much better under LKY.
Let me proceed to puncture each of these myths in turn, with great pleasure.
MYTH 1: We are NOT a “Chinese country”. We are a country that happens to have a majority ethnic-Chinese population that organizes itself on the basis of multiracialism/multiculturalism. This has been fundamental to Singapore’s identity since the days of Lee Kuan Yew, and this is something we must always remember, no matter how many times we are accused of being “race traitors” by our mainland friends. When the PRC tries to impose a “Chinese” identity on multiracial Singapore, we MUST resist.
Yes, we share ties with mainland Chinese on the basis of blood and culture. This ethnocultural kinship should be celebrated, not denied (as in the case of some HKers). Our similar cultural programming allows us to understand the Chinese mindset in some respects, to “empathize” with it.
But it does not mean we should unreservedly parrot China’s claims to the rest of Southeast Asia. As country coordinator for ASEAN-China relations, our job is to uphold ASEAN centrality; to represent the interests of ASEAN, of our REGION, in dealing with China. It is not to represent China’s interests in dealings with ASEAN. We have no obligation, moral or otherwise, to advocate or support China’s interests. Understanding them is one matter. Supporting them is another. The two are not mutually irreconcilable, but they must be distinguished.
MYTH 2: This myth, like many other myths, has a grain of truth to it. It is very ably represented by the speeches and works of Professor Kishore Mahbubani, our former ambassador and an intellectual whom I admire very much. Unfortunately, it is also extremely oversimplified and ignores many problematic nuances.Indeed, China is rising and has been for quite a while. You would have to be blind to deny that. But China’s rise is not going to be linear; it is going to be a long, winding, and fluctuating road. China has many internal structural problems of its own to deal with. From the way some people talk about China in juxtaposition to the West, it makes it sound like the Chinese are strategic masterminds while the Westerners are a bunch of bumbling idiots. Like I said, grain of truth, but grossly oversimplistic. It ignores many of the US’ intrinsic strengths and some of China’s structural challenges.
China is rising, but America is NOT in decline, except in relative terms. Militarily it is still pre-eminent in the Asia-Pacific. Its military dominance is receding and will continue to recede in time, as the PLA Navy becomes stronger. China is becoming more and more economically central to our region and the world; depending on which index of measurement you use (GDP PPP, GDP per capita, absolute GDP) it may have already eclipsed the US economy. China is pushing the frontiers of cutting-edge technology like 5G. This process is inevitable.
But what is not inevitable is the outcome of China displacing the US as regional or global superpower. This is an outcome that is FAR from certain. It is still too early to tell. The only thing we can say for now is that the regional strategic equation will become more and more symmetrical over time. As with buying new stocks/shares on the financial market, it is too early to count our chickens before they are hatched. Some views on China’s rise (Mahbubani’s included) tend to take the Whig view of history - “up and up and on and on”

https://preview.redd.it/y73carvadru41.png?width=602&format=png&auto=webp&s=61264b61a8fd34703f6ea45615f7f5d68400a5ad

https://preview.redd.it/j4ah3bacdru41.png?width=602&format=png&auto=webp&s=0f8887bee600d33e149df5e58cf8b14b2adabd75
https://preview.redd.it/8cvf4iz5cru41.png?width=507&format=png&auto=webp&s=0f72928e74331e9d18ee5e1a66feff38fabe23d0

https://preview.redd.it/gw5o0pyddru41.png?width=461&format=png&auto=webp&s=63229477764d3ca02e2ef6d5186041219dbf539a
The Chinese never tire of reminding us that China’s presence in Asia is a permanent geographic fact, while America’s presence is the product of a political calculation. This implies both enhanced threat and opportunity for the rest of East Asia (be nice to us, because you have to live with us for the rest of eternity). And that is true - what is our Plan B if America withdraws from the region? Without America, the balance of power in Asia cannot be maintained. But again, this myth is too simplistic. America’s presence in Asia is not as fragile as the Chinese would like us to think.
Asia is burgeoning with growth. In the next few decades the economic center of gravity is going to shift toward the Asia-Pacific. America has an interest in retaining access to this region, in economic and military terms. I do agree that China cannot be contained - it is so interdependent with America that America might as well try to contain itself as to contain China. But we should not underestimate the degree to which America has integrated and committed itself to the Asia-Pacific.
MYTH 3: This one I find the most ludicrous and at the same time the most hilarious. Just because I disagree with China’s stance on a SPECIFIC, SINGLE issue means that I must have been brainwashed by western media into being an anti-China dog? Hahahaha.
This is what is known as a false dichotomy. It is powerful because these dichotomies do exist, but they are a spectrum rather than a binary choice of A or B. China posits an illusory binary between itself and the West, and forces you to choose between them. If you are not A, then you must be B and ONLY B and nothing else. Substitute A and B with pro-China and pro-US, pro-CCP and pro-democracy, blah blah blah. You get the idea. This ignores all the nuances in between.
This myth is also the most insidious and dangerous one because it denies the existence of AGENCY on the part of small states. It denies that small states can ever act autonomously -that anything that we do must be driven by the hidden hand of Great Power competition.
Singapore’s policy can be characterized as strategic hedging. I will admit we lean slightly toward low-intensity “soft” balancing against China, but it is still more nuanced than “hard” balancing against China and “hard” bandwagoning with the US.
By the way, Singapore is not the only country practicing a hedging strategy. Duterte has recently taken to flirting with China; I don’t blame him, I think it’s a smart move. But he has also increased cooperation with Japan, and he has not abolished the alliance Treaty which formally commits the US to defend the Philippines in wartime. Thailand has grown closer toward China as well, buying Chinese tanks, but it is still a US ally. Even Myanmar: when Myanmar realized in the 2000s and early 2010s that it was growing more and more dependent on Chinese investment, infrastructure etc., what did it do? It initiated a rapprochement with the Obama Administration. Malaysia under Mahathir began to reassess a number of Chinese infrastructure projects in light of its indebtedness to China. The American 7th Fleet still calls at Malaysian ports. Vietnam is probably leaning even further toward the Balancing end of the spectrum than Singapore - the very existence of Vietnam as an independent entity is predicated on thousands of years of resisting subordination to China.

https://preview.redd.it/z3304oopdru41.png?width=602&format=png&auto=webp&s=781ec3355962a02b7808429eb1396e020f742f15

https://preview.redd.it/bgjxjz0rdru41.png?width=602&format=png&auto=webp&s=2fa9190919b355a8c6155d8f56b2f6456332f617
So, fellow Singaporeans, do not believe that we are alone in playing this delicate game of power-balancing. That is what China wants you to believe: that we are acting alone and inadvertently as a US proxy, when in reality we are making calculated choices to minimize risk and maximize gain.
MYTH 4: Yes, Singapore is a non-claimant state. We have no territorial claims in the South China Sea and we take no position on the claims of Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, China etc. But what we do have is an interest in FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION in the South China Sea (enshrined in international law, namely UNCLOS). We want our merchant ships carrying our imports and exports to be able to transition the South China Sea freely. Trade is the lifeblood of our free and open economy.
Now, some mainland Chinese might argue that China has not explicitly threatened the right of freedom of navigation in the area. They are right. China has not demanded we pay a toll or tariff for passing through the area, not yet anyway. Hopefully it never does. But China’s behavior of creating and militarizing artificial islands in the South China Sea has not exactly inspired confidence on the part of Southeast Asian states regarding its future behavior.
And in case you think our statement on the PCA’s verdict was somehow “extreme” or “new”, let me read out the statement to you:
Singapore has taken note of the Award made by the Arbitral Tribunal convened under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) on 12 July 2016 on the case between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China. We are studying the Award and its implications on Singapore and the wider region. Singapore is not a claimant state and we do not take sides on the competing territorial claims. However, we support the peaceful resolution of disputes among claimants in accordance with universally recognised principles of international law, including Unclos, without resorting to the threat or use of force. As a small state, we strongly support the maintenance of a rules-based order that upholds and protects the rights and privileges of all states. Singapore values our long-standing and friendly relations with all parties, bilaterally and in the context of Asean. We urge all parties to fully respect legal and diplomatic processes, exercise self-restraint and avoid conducting any activities that may raise tensions in the region. Singapore supports the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the expeditious conclusion of a legally binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea
In other words, we did NOT even explicitly SUPPORT the ruling of the PCA in favor of the Philippines. We simply positively acknowledged the ruling and said that international law is important and we should all respect it. Can that be any less provocative? How could this be construed in any way as “taking sides”? Are the Chinese really so thin-skinned that they object to us even SPEAKING about the SCS issue?
Let me remind you that the PCA was the same court that ruled in favor of our dispute with Malaysia over Pedra Branca. So what would the implication be if we supported the PCA ruling for ourselves, but turned a blind eye to its ruling over the SCS? International law for me, but not for thee?
Note also that Singapore was not alone: Vietnam, Myanmar, and Malaysia also positively acknowledged or outright supported the ruling of the PCA. Why did we deserve to be singled out for coercion?
Non-alignment/neutrality is a PREFERENCE. It is not a solution. Singapore cannot prosper and be secure simply by pursuing a “hiding” strategy of laying low and hoping not to be noticed. I will be happy to elaborate if you disagree. We host the US military because we consider it productive to our security interests (and that of regional security) for America to maintain a regional presence. This is to provide a counterweight to China and give us strategic space to maneuver. It is NOT to contain China or obstruct its rise.

https://preview.redd.it/dl1v9eiudru41.png?width=602&format=png&auto=webp&s=674abcbdbdd903a8cc61d6b00f3ef61f0f2d92b0
And while we are on the subject, we should note that the US military only maintains a purely rotational presence in Singapore. There are NO permanent US military bases or assets stationed here. The naval base which their aircraft carrier uses belongs to us. We should also further note that Singapore has NO formal treaty of alliance with America. In fact it is rumored that in 2003 America offered us the status of a major non-NATO ally - a formal security commitment from the US to defend Singapore…and we rejected them. Now, is that how we would behave if we were really American proxies?
“I am non-aligned in the sense that I do not want to be involved in power blocs…but when my security, Singapore’s survival, Singapore’s prosperity is threatened, I cannot be neutral” - Lee Kuan Yew
“Singapore has to take the world as it is, it is too small to change it. But we can try to maximise the space we have to maneuver among the big ‘trees’ in the region” - Lee Kuan Yew, One Man’s View of the World, 2013
MYTH 5: Kishore claimed that “now that LKY is no longer with us, we should change our behaviour significantly…we should be very restrained in commenting on matters involving Great Powers”. I agree with him that we should be circumspect, pragmatic, even cold-blooded, when it comes to dealing with Great Powers. We must tread carefully.
But has there been any fundamental change in Singapore’s policy toward China post-LKY? No. Our relationship with the US goes back to the 1990s. Likewise with China we have always (and I emphasize, we CONTINUE to) promote the engagement of China with the region and the world. China must come to terms with the world order, just as the world order must accommodate China.
The Chinese like to grumble about the good old days of LKY and how well he got along with them. Again, they are not wrong. But this is a form of historical cherry-picking, of selective memory. Remember that LKY was one of the only Asian leaders to go up against a CCP-backed communist united front and win. Remember also that Mao’s China issued frequent propaganda proclamations labelling him a “running dog” of the West.
Lee Kuan Yew’s views on China were not one-dimensional. They were complex and nuanced. They were tactful, yes, but honest and direct. He did not shy away from political incorrectness.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CB4NwQ24Mpk
“The Chinese may make a miscalculation…they may become assertive and pushy, which is contrary to their long-term interest, which is to win over the smaller countries in the south to their side” - Lee Kuan Yew, 2011 “[My uncle-in-law] had this romantic idea that, you know, [China] is a land of my forefathers. I have no doubts that the land of my forefathers would have brought me down in the world…They (the Chinese) wanted me to contribute [to my uncle-in-law’s manor house which the Chinese refurbished and made into a historic tourist site]. I said no, no, I’m not Chinese, I’m Singaporean, I’m not going to visit the place…I have no romantic view about where I sprang from. I’m very grateful that my great grandmother who was born here decided she’s not going to go back (to China) with her husband because she doesn’t know China…I’m a lucky fellow. Yes, we are all lucky fellows. But the older generation has this romantic idea…I discovered when I was a student in England, that I had more in common with the Singaporeans and Malaysians of other races than with the Chinese from China because they are completely different. Their dress, their manners, their language. They are a different lot, that’s all. They come from a different society. Of course, at the end of the day they are Chinese.” -Lee Kuan Yew, Hard Truths, 2011 “That romantic idea of going back to the bosom of your motherland is a delusion. We have become different, that’s all. You can go back to China, you’re still different…If you go to China, I don’t think you will belong. They’ll say okay, we’ll accept you. But look at even the Malayan communist cadres who sent their families and children there…- nevertheless, they were treated differently…You think you’re Chinese , and that you will blend in, but you will not. You are already different. We are already different. Just like the American and the British people, or for that matter, the South African whites, Australians, New Zealanders and the British. The Taiwanese mainlanders and Chinese mainlanders, who have not stayed in Taiwan, yes, they are same stock, same heritage, but had different exposure, different standpoints, different views of the world. Are we Chinese? Yes, ethnically. Can we sit down with the Chinese and really feel part of them? Not possible. Because you speak Chinese? No. Your major premises are in your mind” - Lee Kuan Yew, Hard Truths, 2011 “[The Chinese] expect us to be more respectful - you must respect me. They tell us countries big or small are equal, we’re not a hegemon, 不称霸. But when we do something they don’t like, they say you have made 1.3 billion people unhappy … So please know your place” - Lee Kuan Yew, Hard Truths, 2011 “I do not see Singapore surviving on the Chinese economy. If we spoke only Chinese, we would not be today’s Singapore. What is the difference if China is ten times stronger? It will make us ten times stronger? No. Our prosperity comes from linkages with the world…the future is the same. We are not Hainan Island. We are not Hong Kong, where they have no choice. We are in the centre of an archipelago of great diversity, with rich natural resources, and the world will come here” - Lee Kuan Yew, One Man’s View of the World, 2013 “How can [the Chinese object to the American logistics hub here]? That is crude. If they ask us to stop the logistics base, our answer would be: you can use the logistics base and store your equipment here (so we would host both the Chinese and Americans” - Lee Kuan Yew, One Man’s View of the World, 2013 “Singapore is quite comfortable with the Americans being present. We do not know how brash or assertive China will become. When I said in 2009 that we must balance China, they translated the word in Chinese into ‘conscribe’, and there was a big uproar among their netizens, who asked how dare I say that when I am Chinese. They are hypersensistive” - Lee Kuan Yew, One Man’s View of the World, 2013 “You have to accept the fact that they (China) are the biggest boy in the neighbourhood. They will not be the biggest in the Pacific because the US will always be there to counterbalance them. But increasingly, they would be able to keep the US away from the coastal regions. That’s a development we have to accept. No more [uncomfortable for Singapore] than for the other countries…It’s even more tricky for Vietnam. We have no conflict of interest with China…we have no such overlapping claims with them.” - Lee Kuan Yew, One Man’s View of the World, 2013
CONCLUSION
Let me emphasize again: I see the rise of China as a good thing in the long-term. It is not an ABSOLUTE good, but it is good. China is a FRIEND, even if friends can be pushy at times and we do not always agree with our friends about everything all the time. Singapore and China have no fundamental clash of core interests. Indeed, I think it is possible for our core interests to align with China. Not only with China, but also with the US, India, Japan, etc. Whether or not it aligns with China to a greater degree than with other powers is to be seen, and in large part decided, by China’s own behaviour.
But in any case if there is alignment, our lodestar must always be our NATIONAL INTEREST - Singapore’s own national interest - determined by Singaporeans’ own choices ALONE and no one else’s, undiluted by the manipulation of ANY foreign entity. And in case you think I’m only referring to China, go look at our handling of the 1988 Hendrickson Affair.
Huang Jing was only one manifestation of this. Foreign powers will continue to attempt to influence our policy. When they stick their fingers into our sovereign discursive space, we must continue to quietly, tactfully, but ruthlessly slice those fingers off.
伤其十指 不如断其一指
防人之心 不可无
submitted by ned_stark97 to geopolitics [link] [comments]

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